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This report presents the initial hazard categorization (IHC), final hazard categorization (FHC) for 
the remediation of the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks, located within the IOO-B/C Area of the 
Hanford Site. These tanks are located within the 100-BC-2 Operable Unit. 
The IHC for 11 6-C-3 was determined to be Hazard Category 3. Because the IHC was 
determined to be Hazard Category 3, the development of an FHC was required. This resulted 
in an FHC of below Hazard Category 3 as a result of the analysis presented in this document. 
This FHC determination concludes that no activity or process authorized could credibly result in 
significant consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. 
This analysis includes the following: 
A description of the remediation activities to be performed at the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste 
Tank waste site 
An assessment of the inventories of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 
tanks 
Identification of the hazards associated with the remediation activities performed within the 
IOO-B/C Area where the 11 6-C-3 site is located 
Identification of those accident scenarios with the potential to produce local significant 
consequences during remediation of 11 6-C-3 
An FHC calculation, based on the physical and chemical form of the radionuclides and the 
available dispersive energy sources associated with remediation activities 
Identification of special controls derived from the assumptions made in the FHC calculation 
that are required to ensure that the FHC remains valid 
Identification of project-specific controls established for the protection of the workers that 
apply specifically to the activities under consideration. 
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For hazardous chemicals identified during remediation, the sum of the ratios calculated for the 
IHC did not exceed 1 for either 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 191 0.1 19 or 
40 CFR 68.1 30 thresholds (29 CFR 191 0 and 40 CFR 68). The FHC for the 1 16-C-3 Chemical 
Waste Tanks Remediation Project was determined based on a comparison of the radiological 
material at risk with adjusted DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) threshold quantities. The Category 3 
threshold quantities were adjusted based on the credible release fractions associated with 
remediation activities. This analysis has determined that the FHC for 1 16-C-3 is below 
Category 3 (sometimes referred to as "radiological"). To ensure that the conditions assumed in 
the hazard analysis are maintained, the controls, commitments, and conditions of approval in 
the safety evaluation report shall be incorporated into the project's readiness assessment to be 
completed prior to commencement of the work. 
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This final hazard categorization (FHC) document examines the hazards, identifies appropriate 
controls to manage the hazards, a d documents the commitments for the 1 16-C-3 Chemical 
Waste Tanks Remediation Project. The FHC is based on the hazards associated with natural 
phenomena and remediation activities to be conducted at the IOO-B/C Area where the 
11 6-C-3 site is located. The remediation activities analyzed in this FHC are based on 
recommended treatment and disposal alternatives described in the Engineering Evaluation for 
the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks (BHI 2005e). 
1.1 PURPOS 
This report accomplishes the following: 
Describes the activities to be performed during remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste 
Tanks addressed by this FHC 
Assesses the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials associated with the 
11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
Identifies internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to produce 
significant consequences during remediation of the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
Determines an FHC based on a comparison of the material at risk (MAR) with 
DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) Category 3 threshold quantities (TQs), adjusted to reflect 
the credible release fractions for remediation activities 
Identifies the necessary controls to manage the hazards and to ensure that the FHC 
remains valid. 
1.2 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION 
Section 1.3 describes the project activities that will be authorized by approval of this document. 
Section 1.4 describes how configuration and change control will be managed to maintain 
compliance with the requirements of this document. Section 1.5 summarizes the conclusions 
and project-specific controls. Section 1.6 describes the overall approach used in the FHC 
process. Section 2.0 provides the background information necessary to understand the hazards 
that have potential consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. Section 3.0 
describes the operations that are analyzed and authorized under the FHC document. 
Section 4.0 identifies the hazards present, analyzes the identified hazards, and provides the 
FHC. Section 5.0 describes special controls required to ensure the FHC remains valid, project- 
specific controls, and programmatic controls. Appendix A identifies the inventory of hazardous 
substances, sources of energy, and nonroutine hazards unique to the site. Appendix B 
identifies a systematic examination of the hazards that could potentially lead to a release of 
hazardous substances, ranking of events, and administrative controls that serve to eliminate or 
reduce the frequency of these events. Appendix C provides the quantitative accidents analysis; 
~~~- ~ 
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defines the potential impacts of the site based on a bounding, unmitigated release of radioactive 
material; and provides the adjusted threshold quantities, which form the basis for the FHC. 
1.3 AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES 
The scope of this document involves evaluating the hazards associated with the remediation 
activities for the 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks. The remediation activities include the 
following general activities, which are further described in Section 3.0: 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
Mobilization 
Excavation of soils, piping, tanks, and underlying soil 
Dust suppression 
Waste treatment 
Spill cleanup, if required 
Characterization and stabi I izat ion 
Material handling and transportation 
Decontamination 
Waste transportation 
Closeout sampling and surveying 
Placement of backfill 
Demobilization. 
1.4 FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION EVALUATION PROCESS 
Established configuration/change control processes are in place that allow evaluation of 
proposed changes or discovered conditions that may affect the assumptions, controls, or other 
commitments as identified within this FHC document. If these commitments are violated, work 
will cease so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and implemented, as 
appropriate. Washington Closure Hanford (WCH) off-normal event procedures describe the 
reporting process and protocol applicable to such a discovery. NS-1, Nuclear Safety Manual, 
NS-1-2.1 , "Hazard Categorization," defines the FHC evaluation process for facilities that have 
an FHC of "below Category 3." 
1.5 SAFETY SUMMARY 
Following a detailed analysis of the potential hazards that could be encountered while 
remediating the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks, it was determined that no activity or process 
authorized by this FHC could credibly result in significant consequences to workers, the public, 
or the environment (see Section 4.0). Project-specific controls are detailed in Section 5.1 , and 
programmatic controls are detailed in Section 5.2. 
1.6 HAZARD CATEGORIZAT 
The initial hazard categorization (IHC) for the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks is Category 3 
(BHI 2005d). The FHC for the remediation of 11 6-C-3 was determined to be below Category 3 
(sometimes referred to as radiological). The FHC (Appendix C) for the 11 6-C-3 Chemical 
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Waste Tanks Remediation Project was determined using the total radionuclide inventories and 
the Category 3 TQs from DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) adjusted to reflect credible release 
fractions (BHI 2005b). 
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2.1 HANFORD SITE HISTORY 
From 1943 until 1990, the primary mission of the Hanford Site was to produce nuclear materials 
for the defense of the nation. Waste disposal activities associated with this mission resulted in 
the creation of more than 1,000 past-practice waste sites. The waste sites are contaminated 
with radioactive constituents, chemical constituents, or combinations of both. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Hanford Site in 1943 as an integral part of 
the Manhattan Engineering District mission to produce nuclear weapons for use in World War II. 
The Hanford Site, then referred to as the Hanford Engineer Works, had a specific mission: the 
production of weapons-grade plutonium to fuel the nation's nuclear arsenal. This was 
accomplished through a three-step process that involved the manufacturing of fuels in the 
300 Area, irradiation of fuels in the 100 Area reactors, and the extraction and production of 
plutonium at the chemical separations plants in the 200 Areas. 
The 100 Areas of the Hanford Site were placed on the U S .  Environmental Protection Agency's 
(EPA) National Priorities List on November 3, 1989, under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). A subset of the Hanford Site 
waste sites on the National Priorities List also falls under the jurisdiction of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 
2.2 100-B/C AREA 
The 100-B/C Area is located along the northern boundary of the Hanford Site (Figure 2-1 ), with 
its northern border delineated by the southern bank of the Columbia River. This area contains 
two of the Hanford Site's surplus nine plutonium production reactors. 
Signatories to the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Ecology et al. 1 989) 
developed a coordinated CERCLNRCRA site remediation and remediation strategy to 
comprehensively and expeditiously address environmental concerns associated with the 
Hanford Site. This strategy, known as the Hanford Past-Practice Strategy, emphasizes 
integration of the results of ongoing site remediation activities into the decision-making process 
as soon as practicable (a procedure called the "observational approach") and expedites the 
remedial action process by emphasizing the use of interim actions. 
Investigation and remediation of the past-practice waste sites is governed by the Hanford 
Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, initially signed in 1989 by the US.  Department 
of Energy (DOE), EPA, and the Washington State Department of Ecology. This agreement 
grouped the waste sites into 78 operable units (OUs), each of which was to be investigated and 
remediated separately under the CERCLA program or the RCRA program, depending on the 
designation of the OU. 
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Figure 2-1. The Hanford Site. 
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Like each of Hanford's National Priorities List sites, the 100 Area was divided into OUs, which 
are groupings of individual sites based primarily upon geographic area and common waste 
sources. Geography also played an important role in the grouping of individual sites into OUs. 
Because it may be difficult to assess the environmental impacts of one site without obtaining 
information about other sites in the vicinity, grouping adjacent sites into OUs allows the impacts 
of the sites to be assessed as a group rather than on an individual basis. 
2.3 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
2.3.1 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Site Description 
The 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks are located in the 100-BC-2 OU in the 100-B/C Area and 
were installed in 1955 (Figure 2-2). The 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks are located northeast 
of the 105-C Reactor Building, just outside the exclusion area fence. The tank area is bounded 
by 7.6-cm (3-in.) yellow steel posts. The site currently appears as a vegetation-free, cobble- 
covered field showing evidence of the excavation activities from November 2004. Although not 
backfilled to match the surrounding grade, the tanks are below grade and are not visible 
(Figures 2-3 and 2-4). 
The 1 16-C-3 waste site consists of two underground chemical waste storage tanks, referred to 
as the north tank and the south tank. The tanks are cylindrical in shape with domed ends and 
are positioned horizontally. Each tank is 3.5 m (1 1.5 ft) in diameter, approximately 11 m (36 ft) 
in length, and has a nominal capacity of 102.2 kL (27,000 gal). In November 2004, the liquid 
depth in the north tank was measured at 3.2 cm (1.25 in.) and 1.25 m (4.1 ft) in the south tank. 
The solids-to-liquid ratio in the sample collected from the south tank is 3 g/L. This equates to 
540,000 g (1 , I  90 Ib) of sludge to 34,800 L (9,193 gal) of liquid in the tanks. Based on historical 
Hanford Site drawings, the tanks are spaced about 2.4 m (8 ft) apart (Figures 2-5 and 2-6). 
They are constructed of 9.5-mm (3/8-in.)-thick carbon steel, and the piping associated with the 
tanks is stainless steel. Although the tops of the tanks were originally approximately 3.1 m 
(1 0 ft) below surrounding grade, they were only partially backfilled following November 2004 
sampling and are now about I m (3 ft) below grade (Figure 2-3). Each tank has a 0.76-m 
(30-in.) manhole with a gasketed cover located at one end of the top of the tank. There are also 
six nozzle openings along the length of the top of each tank, ranging in diameter from 7.6 cm 
(3 in.) to 15.2 cm (6 in.). Two steel vent pipes (one for each tank) approximately 3.7 m (12 ft) 
tall extend upward to about 0.6 m (2 ft) above the surrounding grade. 
Three rusted valve handles, approximately 0.9 m (3 ft) tall, protrude from the center of the west 
half of the tank site. A gray 5-cm (2-in.) conduit pipe protrudes from the center of the east half 
of the waste site. This pipe is part of the cathodic protection system that was installed to protect 
storage tanks against corrosion. The site is posted with a sign identifying it as the "I 16-C-3 
Chemical Waste Tanks." The site includes all underground pipelines between the 1 16-C-3 
(105-C) chemical waste tanks to a valve upstream from the south tank. 
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Figure 2-2. 100-BC-2 Operable Unit and 11 6-C-3 Site Location. 
"I I 
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Figure 2-3.  116-C-3 Tank Area Looking East – Photograph Taken March 21, 2000. 
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Figure 2-4.  116-C-3 Tank Area Looking Northeast – Photograph Taken March 21, 2000. 
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A 5-cm (2-in.) Schedule 40 stainless steel valve bypass line connected the 105-C Metals 
Examination Facility (MEF) to the two 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks (see Figures 2-5 and 
2-6). This pipeline was removed as part of remedial action activities for the pipelines. In 
July 2000, the vents were sealed with aluminum tape as a preventive measure for potential 
passive radioactive emissions. 
2.3.2 11 6-C-3 Operational History 
The tanks were designed to receive liquid wastes from the MEF. The MEF was part of the 
105-C Reactor Building and was designed to examine and test irradiated fuel elements. 
Examination and testing sometimes involved mechanical removal of the end caps of the fuel 
slugs and the chemical dejacketing of the remainder of the fuel slugs. 
Chemical dejacketing consisted of immersion of the fuel slugs in 50% (by weight) sodium 
hydroxide for a predetermined reaction time. The sodium hydroxide was then drained into the 
11 6-C-3 tanks and the slugs were rinsed with water. A second immersion in 50% sodium 
hydroxide, with the addition of steam to promote the jacket removal reaction, was followed by a 
second water rinse. The slugs were then cleaned with a 10% (by weight) solution of nitric acid, 
followed by several additional water rinses. 
Historical documentation varies as to whether the tanks were ever used. According to the 
Waste Information Data System, the tanks were never used, and liquid wastes from the MEF 
were instead routed to the 11 6-C-2A Pluto Crib. However, positive results from the survey data 
(smear samples) as well as declassified documents regarding operations and process historical 
data demonstrate that the tanks were used as liquid waste receivers for chemical dejacketing 
waste. 
2.3.3 1 16-C-3 Characterization Activities 
To verify whether the tanks were ever used, characterization activities were performed in 
November 2004. Smear samples taken from the inside of one of the valve nozzle pipes from 
one of the tanks and analyzed in the field indicated the presence of low levels of alpha- and 
beta-gamma-emitting radionuclides. Additional analysis identified the presence of cesium-I 37, 
plutonium-239, and americium-241 . A current estimate of the inventory associated with this 
site, based on process knowledge of the activities that fed into these tanks, is documented in 
(BHI 2005d). 
2.3.4 Sampling Activities and Results 
Sampling conducted in March 2003 (BHI 2003) detected elevated alpha and betdgamma 
contamination in smear samples from the inside of the valve of the south tank, and the results 
are presented in Appendix B of BHI (2005e). Two smear samples were analyzed. Cesium-I37 
and americium-241 had detectable activities in the gamma energy analysis, and plutonium-239 
and americium-241 were detected qualitatively in the alpha energy analyses. Based on these 
results, additional sampling was recommended. 
Sampling of the contents of each tank was performed in October and November 2004 to 
support waste characterization and evaluation of potential waste disposition alternatives for the 
tanks (BHI 2004b, 2005a). In preparation for sampling, a trench was excavated approximately 
3.1 m (IO ft) to the overflow pipe between the two tanks. The length of the overflow pipe was 
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excavated, and the top of the south tank was exposed around the nozzle. Radiological 
screening results of the overflow pipe with a radiation detection instrument were negligible near 
the north tank and 3 mR beta/gamma at contact with the south tank. To complete preparations 
for sampling, the overflow pipe connecting the two tanks was removed to allow access to the 
tank interiors, and vertical stainless steel nozzle extension pipes were bolted to the existing 
overflow pipe flanges on the top of each tank to facilitate sampling. The ends of the removed 
overflow pipe were then sealed, the pipe was placed into the excavation, and 0.9 m (3 ft) of soil 
overburden was placed into the trench, covering the detached overflow pipe (Figure 2-3). 
Before collection of confirmation samples, the tanks were accessed through the riser to obtain 
pH readings, measure waste depths, and collect smear samples from the interior surfaces. 
Both tanks were found to contain liquid. The depth of the liquid in the north tank was 
approximately 3.2 cm (1.25 in.), and the depth of the liquid in the south tank was approximately 
1.3 m (4.1 ft). 
To collect samples of the contents of the south tank, peristaltic pump tubing was lowered into 
the tank and a representative sample of the liquid was pumped from varying depths in the waste 
column into a 3.8-L (I-gal) cubitainer and dispensed into bottles. The south tank liquid was 
described as a clear liquid with a yellowish-green cast that turned black when the solid material 
on the bottom of the tank was pumped into the cubitainer and resuspended in the liquid. The 
solids were separated from the liquid through filtration to facilitate separate analyses. The liquid 
was analyzed for volatile organics, polychlorinated biphenyls, inductively coupled plasma (ICP) 
metals and mercury, gamma energy analysis, gross alpha and beta, radionuclide, nitrate, and 
pH. Solids were analyzed for ICP metals and radionuclides. 
To collect samples of the contents of the north tank, peristaltic pump tubing was lowered into 
the tank and a rust-colored liquid was pumped from the tank into a 3.8-L (I-gal) cubitainer and 
then dispensed into a bottle. Because of the shallow liquid depth in the tank and because the 
nozzle was slightly offset from center, only enough liquid could be pumped out of the north tank 
for collection of a 20-mL sample. Because of insufficient sample volume, the requested 
laboratory analytical list was prioritized and restricted to analysis of ICP metals and mercury. It 
was determined that additional sampling of the north tank was not needed due to the limited 
material in the tank available for sample collection and because field radiological measurements 
collected during confirmatory sampling indicated no significant radiological activity in smear 
samples. 
The newly installed risers were capped following sample collection. 
2.3.4.1 South Tank. Data from smear samples collected from the interior surfaces of the south 
tank indicated 20,000 pCi/g cesium-I 37 and approximately 3,000 pCi/g strontium-90 
(BHI 2005e). The analytical results for liquid collected from the south tank indicate that the 
contents are mixed waste due to the presence of radionuclides and chemical constituents. 
Chromium was measured in the sample at 5.77 mg/L, and lead was measured at 2.26 mg/L. 
The pH of the sample was 13.2. 
Highly dispersible sludge with an estimated thickness of approximately 13 mm (1 in.) was 
separated from the liquid sample and analyzed for metals and radionuclides. Chromium was 
measured in the sample at 1.36 rng/L, and lead was measured at 0.338 mg/L. The sludge by 
itself (Le., separated from the supernate) contains transuranic radionuclide activity of greater 
than 100 nCi/g, which would define the material as transuranic waste if separated from the 
supernate. 
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2.3.4.2 North Tank. No significant detectable radiological contamination was detected in 
smear samples collected from interior surfaces or from field radiological measurements 
(BHI 2005e). The analytical results for liquid collected from the north tank indicate contaminant 
levels below action levels. 
2.4 SEGMENTATION 
No segmentation was applied in the determination of the FHC. 
2.5 DEMOGRAPHICS 
This section describes the local demographics in sufficient detail to understand the potential 
effect of these remediation activities upon downwind receptors. As concluded in Section 4.0, 
the resulting effects (consequences) of a potential release of hazardous materials are limited to 
a localized area contained within the remediation site boundary. 
Population size and distribution are important criteria to assess the magnitude of risk to the 
public from radiological releases. Desert Aire and Mattawa are the closest populated areas to 
the 100-BC-2 OU and are approximately 20.33 and 21.89 km (12.63 and 13.61 mi) away from 
the 100-BC-2 OU, respectively. Approximately 376,000 people lived within a 80-km (50-mi) 
radius of the Hanford Meteorological Station (HMS) in 1990. As of 1999, about 17,000 people 
were employed on DOE-related projects at the Hanford Site. 
Recreationists, consisting of hunters, fishermen, boaters, and off-road sports enthusiasts, enjoy 
activities throughout various parts of the area in proximity to the Hanford Site. The primary 
fishing season is June through November; the main hunting season is from October through 
January. The Columbia River, which is adjacent to the 100-BC-2 OU, is used for recreation and 
is open to the public. The heaviest use of the area by recreationists is on weekends and 
holidays, usually in the early morning. 
Approximately 30 individuals will work on the 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Remediation 
Project, and up to 60 individuals will be working in the 100-B/C Area during 1 16-C-3 remediation 
activities. 
2.6 SITE FEATURES 
This section contains information on the meteorological and geological characteristics of the 
area. 
2.6.1 Meteorology and Climate 
The climate at the Hanford Site is a mid-latitude, semi-arid desert. The summers are usually 
warm and dry with abundant sunshine, while the winters are cool with occasional precipitation. 
Temperature extremes vary from -29°C to 46°C on the Hanford Site (Hoitink et al. 2005). 
Climatological data are available from the HMS (which is located between the 200 East and 
200 West Areas on the Hanford Site) and from the 300 Area meteorological station. The HMS 
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has collected data since 1 945. Appendix A addresses the potential effects associated with 
exposure to heavcold extremes. 
2.6.2 Precipitation 
Precipitation that infiltrates through the ground (i.e., recharge) has the potential to carry 
contaminants through the soil to the groundwater and the river. Average annual precipitation on 
the Hanford Site is 16 cm (6.3 in.). In 1995, the wettest year on record, 31.3 cm (1 2.3 in.) of 
precipitation was measured; in the driest year, 1976, only 7.6 cm (3 in.) was measured. Most 
precipitation occurs during the winter, with more than half of the annual amount occurring from 
November through February. Appendices A and B assess the potential effects associated with 
internal flooding and flooding caused by a probable maximum flood (see also Section 2.6.5). 
January is the wettest month, with an average of nearly 100 hours of precipitation, producing 
just over 2.3 cm of water. Days with greater than 1.3 cm (0.5 in.) of precipitation occur less than 
1 Yo of the year (Hoitink et al. 2005). Appendix A provides an evaluation of water intrusion during 
remediation project activities. Topography within the 1 00 Areas is generally flat, gently sloping 
toward the Columbia River, with no obvious drainage channels. The flat topography, the lack of 
well-defined drainages, and the arid to semi-arid climate suggest that little (if any) surface water 
would accumulate within the site. 
Mean annual run-off from the Pasco Basin is approximately 3% of the total precipitation. The 
remaining precipitation is assumed lost through evapotranspiration, with less than 1 Yo 
recharging the groundwater system. Fayer and Walters (1 995) estimated recharge at the 
100-F Area as high as 55.4 mm/yr (2.2 in./yr) on disturbed, nonvegetated sites with Rupert 
sands. The presence of shrub-steppe and cheatgrass vegetation reduces infiltration. At a 
recharge rate of 55.4 mm/yr (2.2 in./yr), precipitation would take about 28 years to travel 7.6 m 
(25 ft). 
2.6.3 Prevailing Winds 
Historical meteorological data indicate that the prevailing winds align themselves with the 
Columbia River, traveling predominantly from the west and west-northwest. The wind speed 
averages 10 to 12 kph in the winter and 13 to 17 kph in the summer. The strongest winds are 
generally southwesterly, with speeds up to 130 kph. More than 90% of the southwesterly winds 
exceed 30 kph. The daily average wind speed at the 100 Area ranges from 8 to 16 kph. 
High winds are likely to occur during site remediation activities. In the summer, high-speed 
winds from the southwest cause most of the dust storms. There is a remote possibility that high 
winds may also cause airborne missiles (e.g., scrap wood and miscellaneous items at the site). 
Blowing dust occurs at wind speeds higher than 30 kph in areas with limited ground cover and 
low moisture content. An average of eight dust storms per year is recorded at the HMS. A 
storm generally lasts just over 3 hours; however; durations of 18 hours have been documented. 
The maximum wind gust recorded at 15 m (49 ft) above ground surface at the HMS was 
128 kph (Hoitink et al. 2005). A peak gust of 138 kph was calculated with a 100-year return 
period. The return period for gusts of 11 3 kph is 10 years (Stone et al. 1983). 
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2.6.4 Weather Phenomena 
At the Hanford Site, dust storms are a severe weather phenomenon that occur most frequently 
and have the greatest potential effect. 
A severe tornado of the Midwestern type is highly unlikely because of the Pacific Northwest's 
climatologic and topographic conditions. Only two tornado funnel clouds and one small tornado 
(June 1948) have been observed within the Hanford Site in the 34-year period between 1945 
and 1978. On average, Washington State experiences just over one tornado each year. The 
probability of a tornado striking a point at the Hanford Site is estimated to be 9.6 by 1 Om6 per 
year. As stated in the environmental impact statement (DOE 1987), tornadoes are infrequent 
and generally small in the northwest portion of the United States. 
Washington State has an annual mean number of thunderstorm days of 10, which is considered 
to be relatively low (IEEE 1991). Thunderstorms occur most frequently from April to September. 
Lightning strikes in the summer occasionally have ignited range fires in the Hanford Site region. 
2.6.5 Hydrologic Descr i pt i on 
The 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks are situated within the Columbia River drainage basin. 
Two major rivers within the Columbia River drainage basin border the Hanford Site: the 
Columbia and Yakima Rivers. 
The maximum floods on record occurred in 1894 and 1948, with peak flows at the Hanford Site 
estimated at 21,000 m3/s and 20,000 m3/s, respectively (Neitzel 1997). These floods occurred 
before the Priest Rapids Dam and several other upriver dams had been constructed. 
The flow regulation resulting from the upriver dams significantly lessens the projected intensity 
of the potential 1,000-year flood to about 12,400 m3/s. The regulated flood of 1997 was just 
under this level. Thus, a 1,000-year flood would not inundate any of the reactor areas or burial 
grounds (DOE 1996) because of the regulated flows. 
Neitzel (1 997) also discusses a potential flood caused by a 50% breach of the Grand Coulee 
Dam, caused by sabotage or war. This breach would cause a flow estimated at 600,000 m3/s 
and would cause significant flooding, including (for the Hanford Reach area) the remainder of 
the 100 Areas, West Lake and Gable Mountain Pond, the 300 Area, and nearly all of Richland, 
Washington (DOE 1996). The potential effects from this scenario on waste site have not been 
considered further because "...a breach under these conditions would indicate an emergency 
situation in which there might be other overriding major concerns" (Neitzel 1997). 
2.6.6 Geology and Seismology and Volcanology 
The Hanford Site lies within the Columbia Intermontane Province, which is bordered on the 
north and east by the Rocky Mountains, on the west by the Cascade Range, and on the south 
by the Basin and Range Province. The dominant geological characteristics of the Columbia 
Intermontane Province have resulted from flood basalt volcanism and deformation processes. 
The geologic structure beneath the 100 Area is similar to much of the Hanford Site, which 
consists of three distinct levels of soil formations: the deepest level is a series of basalt flows 
that have warped and folded over time. The top level is also a basalt layer, the top of which 
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ranges in elevation from 46m (1 50 ft) below sea level, to 64m (21 0 ft) below sea level. The 
middle layer, known as the Ringold Formation, consists of silt, gravel, and sand. 
The Hanford Site is in a seismic Zone 2b, as defined by the International Building Code 
(IBC 2000). Earthquake records for the Pacific Northwest extend to the 1850s. A network of 
seismographs was installed on the Columbia Plateau in 1969. Slope subsidence is the most 
likely result of seismic activity at a partially excavated burial ground. Seismic activity and 
related phenomena are not anticipated to result in significant radiological consequences to 
workers and the public from the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Remediation Project because 
of the low energy of anticipated seismic activity and the form and distribution of the hazardous 
substances. In addition, it is not anticipated that multiple accident events would be initiated 
(similar to what may occur at a facility) as a result of a seismic event at the burial grounds. 
The stratigraphic record in the Pasco Basin suggests that tephra is the only primary product of 
Cascade Range volcanism that may reach the Pasco Basin during the next 10,000 years. 
During the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was 
deposited at the HMS tower. In the first 9 hours following the eruption, about 1 mm (0.04 in.) of 
uncompacted ash was recorded at the Energy Northwest Plant 2 meteorological station. 
Prevailing winds carried the majority of the ash cloud north of the Hanford Site. 
Normal yearly snowfall is 35 cm (1 3.8 in.). The highest annual snowfall on record is 1 14.6 cm 
(45.1 in.), which occurred in 1916 (Hoitink et al. 2005). 
2.6.7 Local Ecology 
A species of concern near the IOO-BK Area is the federally protected bald eagle, generally 
found from November through March. Established bald eagle roosting and nesting sites are 
found near the 100-B/C Area, but the I1  6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks are not within the buffer 
zone established to protect the eagles. 
2.6.8 Adjacent Facilities 
It is unlikely that any accidents specific to facilities outside of the 100-BC-2 (e.g., explosions and 
spills) will impact the 11 6-C-3 site due to significant distances between this OU and surrounding 
facilities. The most probable impacts would be an evacuation as a result of a release of 
inventory from a nearby facility due to an accident or a fire. No activities are being carried out at 
the 11 6-C-3 site that would be adversely impacted if an evacuation were required. A release of 
inventory from a nearby facility would not interact with the MAR at the remediation sites. In 
addition, there are no facilities close enough to the 11 6-C-3 site to be affected by accidents at 
the 1 16-C-3 site. Therefore, based on the above discussion, no significant adverse impacts on 
the remediation site would occur from other projects on the Hanford Site. 
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3.0 OPERATIONS 
All 11 6-C-3 remediation activities will conform to the WCH work process controls and 
procedures that guide all site activities. 
3.1 PROJECT ACTIVITIES 
The 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Remediation Project involves three distinct phases: 
mobilization, remediation, and demobilization/closeout. This FHC is primarily concerned with 
the identification and evaluation of radiological hazards associated with the remediation phase 
of the work. 
The preferred remediation and disposal option is solidification (e.g., grouting) of the tank 
contents. If not completely filled during placement of solidification agent, a fixative agent may 
be applied to the upper levels of the interior tank surfaces (north and south). This step will 
capture and fix in place any residual smearable and potential airborne contamination inside of 
the tanks before size-reduction activities are performed. Heavy equipment (e.g., plate shears in 
the universal processor of an excavator) will be used for sectioning the tanks, and either metal 
sheers or a bucket and thumb arrangement will be used to load out the sectioned pieces. Size 
reduction using shears will involve first separating the metal tank material from the solidified 
contents at the 11 6-C-3 site. The tank metal will be reduced in size sufficiently to place into one 
or more Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility (ERDF) containers. The remaining 
solidified waste monolith (if not broken during separation from the tank) will be covered with a 
layer of soil or dust suppressant to minimize air emissions and provide shielding, and then 
rubbilized with blows from the bucket of the excavator. The mixture of soil and rubbilized waste 
monolith would then be loaded into ERDF containers for transport and disposal to ERDF. It is 
assumed that the tank and solidified contents would meet the ERDF waste acceptance criteria 
(BHI 2 0 0 5 ~ ) .  
The northern (essentially empty) tank may be used as a mock-up test facility for the dry 
materials addition operation. Activities on the northern tank would be similar to those described 
for the southern tank, except that about 34,000 L (9,000 gal) of water would be added to the 
northern tank to simulate the liquid in the southern tank. 
Remediation activities include the following, as appropriate: 
0 Excavation using backhoes and other heavy equipment to access inactive transfer lines, 
tanks and process equipment 
0 Use of decontamination techniques appropriate for areas that contain airborne or loose 
contamination 
0 The use of cutting tools (e.g., plasma arc torch, water-jet cutting) to remove portions of the 
top of the tank may be performed to facilitate detailed characterization and tank material 
treatmentlremoval 
0 Size reduction (e.g., hydraulic shears, grinders, snippers, wire saws, mechanical 
disassembly, rubbilizing of solidified tank contents) and removal of tank and contents, 
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structural components, concrete, underground transfer lines, including use of temporary 
enclosures and vacuum systems, as necessary, for control of radiological contamination 
Removal of steel, inactive process equipment, transfer lines, and waste containers 
Backfilling of trenches created as a result of the remediation of tanks and transfer lines 
Installation of radiological control areas (e.g., radiological buffer areas), as necessary, 
during remediation activities 
Periodic or continuous health and safety monitoring activities, as required (e.g., site-specific 
health and safety plan [SS HASP], radiation work permit [RWP], site-specific instructions) 
Loading of tank sections and rubbilized waste debris into ERDF containers or other 
approved packaging for transportation and disposal 
Use of dust-suppression techniques during remediation activities. Removed debris (e.g., 
tank, piping, and other contaminated materials) will be staged temporarily in ERDF 
containers, waste drums, or other approved containers before final disposition. 
3.1.1 Mobilization 
Mobilization typically includes the establishment of infrastructure that is needed to support the 
conduct of remediation activities, such as the following: 
Installation of diesel- or gasoline-powered generators, if required, to provide temporary 
power for remediation activities 
If required, installation of personnel changing/shower/rest rooms/personal protective 
equipment, lunchroom, and administrative facilities (typically portable trailers) 
Staging of heavy equipment (e.g., backhoes, cranes, excavators) for removal of piping, 
transfer lines, and sheared tank sections 
Installation of industrial safety and radiological monitoring equipment (e.g., specified in the 
SS HASP, RWP, or other approved safety documentation) 
Staging of maintenance and support equipment. 
3.1.2 Excavation 
The appropriate equipment to support excavation activities will be available. Any additional 
unique equipment required to support the work activities at the site will be evaluated to ensure 
that any critical assumptions identified within the FHC are not affected. The initial remedial 
investigation activities have been completed. Areas with known contamination will be 
excavated to a predetermined depth with the appropriate surveys conducted. 
Field screening will be ongoing throughout the excavation phase. If contaminated materials are 
found, they will be placed into transfer containers for shipment to ERDF or other disposal sites. 
The uncontaminated soils will be stockpiled for site backfill when all of the contaminated soils, if 
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any, have been removed. Contaminated debris (e.g., tank and pipe materials) will be cut, as 
necessary, and placed into ERDF containers for shipment to ERDF. 
Visible dust emissions from the 1 16-C-3 site is not permitted. At active excavations water or 
other methods shall be used, as approved, for dust control in accordance with agreements 
between the DOE, Richland Operations Office, EPA, and the Washington State Department of 
Health. Water usage for dust control shall be minimized to protect against contaminant 
migration. Crusting agents or fixants shall be applied to any disturbed portion of the 
contamination area, if any, that will be inactive for more than 24 hours. Material to be disposed 
of at ERDF shall also comply with the moisture content and other applicable requirements of the 
ERDF waste acceptance criteria. 
3.1.3 Dust Suppression 
Two methods of dust suppression may be used for the 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
Remediation Project. The first method is water application. Water is generally applied at the 
excavation dig face, on haul roads, parking lots, etc., whenever dust can be generated during 
the project. The second method is the use of crusting agents. A fixative (crusting agent) will be 
applied to a trench face before periods of inactivity longer than 24 hours and when sustained 
wind speeds over 20 kph (1 2 mph) are forecasted for the 100 Areas. 
The project will receive daily weather forecasts from the HMS, which will provide the predicted 
sustained wind velocity forecasts. Decisions to apply crusting agents will be based on these 
forecasts. In addition, the project will also be on the call list for weather advisories and will use 
those reports for decision making. 
3.1.4 Waste Treatment 
Materials contaminated with chemicals at levels exceeding waste disposal acceptance criteria 
will be treated by fixatives/solidification/stabilization or other appropriate treatment technology. 
Solidification and stabilization are treatment technologies designed to reduce contaminant 
solubility, mobility, and toxicity through chemical or physical changes. Typical solidification and 
stabilization agents include cement-based materials (Le., grout), clays, asphalt, and resins (e.g., 
epoxies). Contaminated materials treated to meet applicable treatment standards will be 
disposed of in the same manner as other materials that meet waste acceptance criteria without 
treatment. 
During the solidification process, contaminated waste may be temporarily removed from the 
tank (e.g., via hoses or flexible piping), treated with solidification agent, and returned to the tank. 
In addition, materials may be removed from the tank to perform treatability testing. 
Mixing of solidification agent and tank waste will be performed during waste treatment (e.g., 
compressed gas, mechanical mixers). 
The selected remedy (in accordance with the record of decision) is currently to remove, treat (if 
required), and dispose. For purposes of the design basis, "treatment as required" has two main 
components: (1 ) treatment to reduce volume of contaminated waste, thereby lowering 
remediation costs, and (2) treatment as a regulatory requirement (e.g., dangerous waste). 
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3.1.5 Volume Reduction 
Waste volume reduction practices, such as size reduction, decontamination (if feasible or 
practical), minimizing cross-contamination during remedial action, or segregation of clean 
overburden from contaminated materials, will be implemented, as appropriate. 
3.1.6 Anomalous Waste 
Anomalous waste (Le., waste that needs additional characterization and/or treatment) is not 
anticipated at this waste site. However, if encountered, anomalous waste will be set aside in 
staging piles or containers within a staging pile area. Unknown anomalous waste will be 
characterized more extensively through a combination of field screening or analytical laboratory 
characterization, using a graded approach as described in the 700 Area Remedial Action 
Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP) (DOE-RL 2005). In addition, a site-specific SAP will be 
prepared for the 11 6-C-3 waste site. 
3.1.7 Limited Characterization 
Additional field investigation activities may include test pit excavation, field radiological 
screening, and collection/analysis of samples. Findings from the field investigations will be 
evaluated and incorporated through the FHC evaluation process. 
3.1.8 Stabilization 
Some waste materials will require stabilization to maintain worker exposure to airborne 
contaminants and/or direct radiation as low as reasonably achievable (tank liquids and sludges). 
As discussed previously, stabilization methods may include the use of solidification agents to 
encapsulate particulates and/or to provide shielding. Other methods of fixing contamination 
such as coatings or expandable foams will also be used on the internal surfaces of the tanks 
and ancillary piping systems, as appropriate. Exposed soil surfaces will be stabilized through 
the application of soil fixatives if the site is to be left unattended for greater than 24 hours or the 
meteorological forecast includes a high-wind warning. 
3.1.9 Material Handling and Transportation 
Material-handling and transportation activities will be performed inside the 1 16-C-3 area of 
contamination and staging pile area. Contaminated materials are loaded into the shipping 
containers (provided by ERDF) and moved by haul truck to the survey station. At the survey 
station, the loaded shipping containers are surveyed to verify that the outside is free of 
radiological contamination. If noncontaminated, the containers are moved to the transfer station 
where an ERDF haul truck picks up the container. When necessary, decontamination will be 
conducted. Transportation to the disposal facility is provided by ERDF. The project and ERDF 
ensure that all appropriate shipping requirements, including use of appropriate shipping 
containers and labeling, are met. Containerized waste may also be temporarily stored at the 
waste site to accommodate surveying and loading schedules. 
Certain bulky items that exceed the capacity of standard ERDF containers (e.g., large metal 
objects, piping, concrete sections) may be size reduced, packaged, and shipped in accordance 
with the ERDF waste acceptance criteria document (BHl 2002a) and the Supplemental Waste 
Acceptance Criteria for Bulk Shipment to the €nvironmental Restoration Disposal Facility 
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(BHI 2005c) with specified criteria and procedures. Shipment of U.S. Department of 
Transportation hazardous materials will comply with Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 
or will require safety documentation demonstrating an equivalent degree of safety. 
3.1 .I 0 AssessmentlCharacterization and Waste Designation 
Assessment consists of radiological surveys and sampling and preparation of all engineering 
and safety documents and subcontract documents to perform the field activities. Sampling of 
waste streams, both before and during remediation activities, to support worker health and 
safety and to support determination of final disposition of waste is performed in accordance with 
the SAP (DOE-RL 2005). 
The extent of radiological contaminants will be monitored onsite using a combination of hand- 
held and fixed-mounted sodium iodide detectors. Additional alpha, beta, and gamma detectors 
may be used as determined by the project radiological engineer or the SAP. These detectors 
will be used to guide excavation in accordance with the observational approach to remediation. 
The contaminant data will be entered into appropriate databases and used for guiding remedial 
excavation, packaging the waste, adjusting waste profiles, updating MAR and FHC calculations, 
and providing backup data to support completion of waste tracking forms. 
Chemical characterization data will be obtained by discrete samples of liquids, soil, and debris, 
if required, in accordance with the SAP with analysis provided by a contract laboratory. 
Laboratory results will be entered into a database to support remedial action site closeout 
decisions and contaminated waste disposal. Chemical field screening methods may be used 
and will follow the methods specified in the SAP. Details of the characterization requirements 
are described in the data quality objective report/SAP. 
3.1 .I 1 Decontamination 
Decontamination will occur at the waste site or the survey station. If minor contamination is 
found on the outside of shipping containers at the survey station, the item will be 
decontaminated at the survey station. If major contamination is found, the container will be 
routed back through the waste site for decontamination. Following decontamination, the 
shipping container is then returned to the survey station to ensure that the outside of the 
container is free of removable contamination. Equipment and materials exiting waste site 
contamination areas or surface contamination areas may be decontaminated at the waste site. 
3.1 .I2 Waste Transportation 
The transport of contaminated material requires reusable containers to be filled at the 
remediation site, surveyed and decontaminated, if required, taken to a storage area, and then 
hauled to ERDF for unloading. Transportation will be performed in accordance with River 
Corridor Closure Contractor (RCCC) procedures and subcontract documents. 
3.1 .I3 Closeout Sampling and Surveying 
Closeout sampling and surveying will be conducted after all contaminated soil and debris has 
been removed from the 11 6-C-3 remediation area. The purpose of the closeout sampling is to 
provide a reasonable level of confidence that the remedial action goals have been met. The 
requisite amount of samples will be obtained based on the requirements specified in the SAP. 
~~ 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 3-5 
Operations 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
3.1 .I 4 Demobilization 
Two methods of demobilization can occur during the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
Remediation Project: (1 ) demobilization from the site before closeout (where closeout is defined 
as the completion of all stabilization activities, such that the site can be unmonitored) and 
(2) final site closeout followed by demobilization of the site. 
Demobilization from the site (before closeout) typically consists of the following activities: 
0 Excavated materials that have previously been determined to be stable are configured to 
minimize releases of inventory (e.g., dry overpacked) and are staged on site. These 
activities will be ongoing during the remediation process. 
0 A crusting agent is applied to all soil surfaces and stockpiles to provide dust control during 
the period of inactivity. 
Prior to closeout, the waste site will be evaluated by appropriate site and safety personnel to 
determine what activities/actions are required to place the site in a condition that meets any 
controls identified in the Safety Basis. 
Activities involved with demobilization of a waste site after closeout will consist of 
decontaminating equipment, as well as those activities associated with the removal of fencing 
and boundary barriers. 
3.1 .I 5 Operational Systems 
Water from existing mains is not potable (Le., raw water) and, therefore, will be used only for fire 
protection, decontamination (as necessary), and dust suppression. The potable water supply is 
not at risk of contamination from the excavation site. Potable water is trucked to the site for 
sanitary use. Potable water is not used for dust suppression. The project has two raw water 
supply sources: (1) a water fill station in the 100 Area located near the river and (2) a water fill 
stations installed at the project. 
The dust-suppression water trucks are filled from a raw water source through an air gap 
between the tank and the fill line. The water line also has a double-check valve to prevent any 
backflow into the system. The water truck may travel down haul roads within radiological buffer 
areas to spray the roads within the waste site. Upon exiting the radiological buffer area, the 
water truck will be surveyed for contamination. The dust-suppression water truck will be 
surveyed when leaving a radiological buffer area for contamination control, but will not be 
surveyed when leaving a radiological buffer area for dose control." 
The project will have at least one dust-suppression water truck onsite to apply water. Water is 
applied where appropriate, using truck nozzles, sprinkler systems, and fire hoses. Pipes may 
be used to direct water flow on the site. 
Crusting agents will be stored onsite. The agent will be mixed with water in the water trucks 
before application. 
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3.2 SAFETY-SIGNIFICANT S 
The 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Remediation Project does not employ any safety- 
significant systems, structures, or components. This is consistent with the FHC of the facility as 
below Category 3 (radiological). 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 3-7 
0 pe rat i o ns 
W CH-207 
Rev. 0 
FHC for the Remediation of the 7 76-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 3-8 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
4.0 HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANA 
4.1 FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION 
Appendix C presents the details of the FHC. 
The total inventory of the 1 16-C-3 tanks exceeds the DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Category 3 
threshold (DOE 1997). The IHC is Hazard Category 3. In accordance with NS-I -2.1 , "Hazard 
Categorization" (NS-I), an FHC and supporting hazard analysis must be prepared for any site 
or project that receives an IHC of Hazard Category 3 or above. 
This section consists of the hazard analysis and the FHC for the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste 
Tanks Remediation Project. The process to develop FHCs and hazard analyses is fully 
described in NS-1-3.2, Guide for Performing Hazard Analysis and Final Hazard Categorizations. 
The hazard evaluation for the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Remediation Project determined 
the FHC to be below Category 3 (sometimes referred to as "radiological") (BHI 2005b). 
4.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATIO 
The objective of the hazard identification process is to provide a basis from which to analyze the 
hazards associated with a facility (Le., internal, external, natural phenomena, and common 
cause events) with the potential to adversely affect the public, workers, or the environment. To 
achieve this objective for the 1 1 6-C-3 remediation activities, the hazard identification process 
was used to address the following issues: 
0 
e 
0 
0 
Characteristics of the inventory of hazardous substances at the site 
Sources of energy inside the site capable of interacting with those inventories 
Sources of energy outside the site capable of interacting with those inventories 
Nonroutine hazards unique to the site. 
Common industrial hazards were addressed only to the extent that they could lead or 
contribute to a release of hazardous substances. The hazard identification process builds on 
the inventory identification effort. The initial hazard categorization defined the total inventories 
of hazardous substances within the site. The hazard identification process characterizes the 
hazardous material inventories in terms of quantity, as a function of form and location within the 
site. 
Prominent material forms at the 1 16-C-3 site include buried, partially buried, and exposed pipes 
and tanks; fixed and removable surface contamination on tank and piping services; residual 
liquids in pipes, tanks, and tank heel; chemical contaminants from dejacketing operations; and 
fuels and oils in vehicles. 
This FHC assumes that any chemicals introduced to the waste site during remediation activities 
(e.g., stabilization) will be made of noncombustible materials. 
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4.2.1 Research 
A document search was conducted for documents related to the waste site. Indices were 
reviewed and documents were inspected for pertinent information. Additional searches were 
conducted in various libraries and records holding areas of the information listed below: 
0 Declassified Document Retrieval System 
0 Historical operations documentation 
0 Construction drawings for the waste site 
e Photographs 
0 Previous tank sampling documentation and analytical results. 
Maps and engineering drawings references identified in the searches described above were 
reviewed by engineering staff to identify other potential information sources referenced therein. 
Pertinent references in the documents described above were obtained and reviewed as well. 
The hazards identified during the hazard identification process (Appendix A, Table A-1 ) were 
generated from the above-referenced sources of information. These sources were used to 
identify the inventories of hazardous substances at the 11 6-C-3 waste site, as well as the types 
of energy sources that could impact these inventories. Other information sources included 
process knowledge, interviews with staff, and engineering judgment. 
The depth of detail employed during the review of site-related documentation was considered 
sufficient to allow identification of the hazard controls necessary to provide adequate protection 
from hazards encountered during remediation of the site. This research also included a review 
of the following types of information: 
e 
0 
e 
0 
0 
e 
0 
0 
e 
e 
0 
e 
Remediation reports 
Hazard assessments 
Hazard screenings 
Hazard identification documents 
Criticality evaluations 
Previous DOE-approved safety analyses 
Hanford Site Waste information Data System 
Remedial investigation/feasibility study reports or studies 
Waste remediation reports 
Excavation reports 
Closeout reports. 
SAP (DOE-RL 2005) 
4.2.2 Inventory 
Based on sampling and analysis data, the radiological inventory listed in Table 4-1 has been 
identified or assumed in the MAR for the contaminated soils and the 1 16-C-3 tanWpiping liquids, 
sludges, steel (BHI 2005d). 
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Liquid Steel Soil Total 
Table 4-1. Radiological Inventory for the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks. 
~ 
U-238 
Y-90b 
-4.6E-03 1.3E-04 4.3E-05 8.8E-05 4.8E-03 
7.6E+00 8.7 E-02 2.9E-02 5.9 E-02 7.8E+OO 
I -- I -- I 4.1E-01 Am-241 I 4.1E-01 I -- 
c-14 I 3.OE-04 I 7.1E-04 I 2.4E-04 I 4.8E-04 I 1.7E-03 
CO-60 I 2.1E-02 I 3.3E-04 I 1.1E-04 I 2.2E-04 I 2.2E-02 
cs-137 I 2.9E-01 I 1.1E+00 I 3.5E-01 I 7.1E-01 I 2.4E+OO 
I -- I -- I 2.8E-03 Eu-152 1 2.8E-03 I -- 
I -- I -- 1 3.3E-03 Eu-154 1 3.3E-03 I -- 
H-3 I 7.6E-05 I 2.OE-03 I 6.7E-04 I 1.4E-03 I 4.1E-03 
Ni-63 1 6.9E+00 I -- I -- I -- I 6.9E+00 
Pu-238 I 8.6E-03 I -- I -- I -- I ~ 8.6E-03 
Pu-239/240 I 1.8E+00 I -- -- I 1.8E+00 I -- I 
Pu-24 1 a 1 1.8E+00 I -- I -- I -- I 1.8E+00 
Sr-90 I 7.6E+00 I 8.7E-02 I 2.9E-02 I 5.9E-02 I 7.8E+OO 
U-2331234 I 4.5E-03 I 1.2E-04 I 4.OE-05 1 8.1E-05 1 4.7E-03 
Total I 2.6E+01 I 1.2E+00 I 4.1E-01 I 8.3E-01 I 2.9E+O1 
NOTE: Inventory calculated in Determination of Material at Risk (MAR) for 116-C-3, 01 00C-CA-NO01 1 , Rev. 0 
(BHl2005d). 
a Although not included in laboratory analyses, an inventory for plutonium-241 have been included above for sludge. 
Assuming weapons-grade plutonium and 45-year-old material, the inventory for plutonium-241 has been estimated 
to be equal to that of plutonium-239/240 (based on a plutonium-241 :plutonium-239/240 ratio of 1 for the sludge 
material in the 11 6 4 - 3  tanks). Other isotopes (e.g., uranium-235) would also be expected; however, the 
inventories from such isotopes are considered negligible contributors to the sum-of-the ratios values. 
Yttrium-90 is assumed to be in secular equilibrium with its parent, strontium-90. Barium-1 37m is also in secular 
equilibrium with its parent, cesium-1 37, but because there are no EPA release values reported in Technical 
Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act: Radionuclides (EPA 1989), this radionuclide was not included in the 
FHC calculations. 
EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
FHC = final hazard categorization 
4.2.3 Hazards Identified 
The hazard evaluation results for the 1 16-C-3 remediation activities are summarized in 
Appendix A. The hazard types that could affect the inventory of hazardous substances 
associated with the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks are tabulated in Appendix A, Table A-1 . 
Each remediation project activity can be related to a set of generic hazards. The following 
hazard types were identified as being potentially associated with the 1 16-C-3 remediation 
project activities: 
0 Radiological material 
e Fissionable material 
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e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
0 
e 
Toxic material (heavy metals) 
Carcinogens 
Biohazards 
Corrosive material 
Electrical hazards 
PotentiaVkinetic energy hazards 
Noise hazards 
Temperature extremes 
Asphyxiates 
Seismic 
Exposure to hazardous chemicals 
External exposure to ionizing radiation 
Internal uptake of radioactive material 
Explosive concentration of gases 
Fi r e/f I a m m a b I e mat e r i a I s 
Natural phenomena hazards. 
A number of industrial hazards are associated with the remediation of any waste site. Many 
of these hazards are common to the non-nuclear industry, and their prevention and/or mitigation 
consists of standard industrial safety practices. The controls that will be used to manage these 
routine hazards are discussed in Section 5.2. 
4.2.4 Hazards Summary 
Following the hazards identification process, generic internal events and project activity-related 
events that could introduce energy sources to hazardous materials at risk (and thus result in a 
release of hazardous materials to the environment) were evaluated and documented in 
Appendix B, Table B-I. The haza 
Remediation Project is presented 
evaluation process for the 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
4.3 HAZARD EVALUATION 
A hazard evaluation workshop was held on May 10, 2005. A multidisciplinary team completed a 
systematic review of the potential hazards associated with the remediation activities. 
The objectives of this process are as follows: 
Identify the events that could lead to releases of hazardous substances and which require 
additional quantitative analysis 
e Rank these events based on potential consequences and frequency 
e Identify engineered mitigative and preventative features that serve to control the hazard 
e Identify the commitments and administrative controls necessary to manage the hazard. 
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This section evaluates the potential interactions of the hazards identified in Appendix A and the 
project activities described in Section 3.1 that could result in potential consequences to workers 
or the environment. 
4.3.1 Hazard Evaluation Summary 
The hazards evaluated in this section originated from the hazard identification process 
discussed in Appendix A. To this end, the hazard evaluation process involved a facilitated 
meeting with the following types of personnel: 
e Experienced safety analysts 
e Fire protection professionals 
0 Nuclear criticality specialists 
0 
0 Design engineering personnel 
e Field engineers and superintendents. 
Radiation control and industrial hygiene professionals 
The hazard evaluation considered a broad range of events. Many of these events have 
negligible or low consequences and are adequately managed with the programmatic controls 
identified in Section 5.2. These events do not require detailed treatment in the FHC document. 
Also, although certain events considered in the evaluation process potentially have significant 
consequences, the probability of some of the events actually occurring is beyond extremely 
unlikely (i.e., any event with a frequency of 1 x 10?yr or less). These events also do not require 
detailed treatment in the FHC document. 
The results of the hazard evaluation are presented in Appendix B, Table B-6. These hazards 
were identified as having the greatest potential consequences (i.e., greatest impact to the MAR 
at the 1 16-C-3 remediation site). The bounding hazards were identified as requiring detailed 
hazard analysis. 
4.3.2 Applicable Activities, Exposures, and Controls 
This section presents detailed hazard evaluations for the hazards that were identified in 
Appendix 6, Table B-1 as being the bounding unmitigated release. This section also identifies 
any activities that would be bounded by the consequences of these bounding accident 
scenarios and identifies the controls that are applicable to the bounding accident scenarios. 
These controls are categorized as follows: 
0 Special controls. These controls are required to maintain the assumptions used to 
determine the FHC 
e Project-specific controls. These controls are established to protect the workers for the 
specific accident under consideration and arise from the hazard evaluation process 
(e.g., emergency response instructions and material-handling restrictions). 
e Programmatic controls. These controls are institutional controls established for worker 
protection that apply to the activity under consideration (e.g., elements of the radiation 
control program, rigging procedures, and training requirements). 
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Appendix 8, Table B-6 identifies several hazardous events that could lead to releases from the 
1 16-C-3 remediation activities (e.g., natural phenomena, impact from excavation equipment). 
Such events could lead to releases as a result of high winds, dumping materials, wind 
entrainment from exposed materials, and initiation of a fire causing heating of contaminated 
materials. The following subsections discuss the impacts of these release mechanisms on the 
materials from the 11 6 4 - 3  remediation activities and assess the respirable airborne release 
fractions (ARFs). 
Modified ARFs were used to adjust DOE-STD-1027 Category 3 TQs for each of the following 
accident scenarios by multiplying tabled TQ values in DOE-STD-1027 by the ARF value used 
determine the original tabled TQ value, and dividing by the ARF appropriate for the specified 
accident scenario. 
Dust mitigation measures (dust su pression) will be used. The soil that is to be processed 
during remediation of the 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks may also require application of dust 
suppression prior to placement in containers before shipment to ERDF. These containers use 
protective tarps to limit the amount of contaminated soil that could be released to the 
environment. 
0 
4.4 BOUNDING ACCIDENT SCENARIOS AND CONSEQUENCES 
4.4.1 Dumping 
Contaminated Soil or Stabilized Material: Dumping/spilling of soil/solidified contents could be 
initiated by several mechanisms: (1) operator loss of control of an excavator bucket during the 
loadout of the soiVpulverized solidified matrix or (2) spilling and resuspension of solidified 
material during tank-shearing operations. The respirable ARF for dumping/spilling used in 
Roberson (2002) Attachment 4 is 1 .OE-06. Therefore, the respirable release fraction (R value) 
used for dumping or spilling of contaminated soil is 1 .OE-06. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids expected to be present 
during remediation activities of the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks are limited to used personal 
protective equipment (PPE), which may be stored in drums near the waste site. Used PPE will 
have minimal contamination and is made of very lightweight materials. Consequently, the PPE 
would generate little force during impact with surfaces. DOE (2000), Section 5.2.3.1 , states that 
no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such materials. Therefore, 
dumping of contaminated combustible solids is not considered further in this calculation. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids (e.g., piping) 
will be excavated from the waste site during remediation activities. The solids may be lifted out 
of the excavation and dropped, resulting in a release of surface contamination. Only those 
contaminated particles that are loose (i.e., not combined with the surface matrix) on the surface 
of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release. The majority of the surface 
contamination on noncombustible solids is expected to be in the form of a scale that is strongly 
adhered to the solid (i.e., pipe, tank) surface. DOE (2000), Section 5.3.3, addresses free-fall 
spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding R value for shock vibration of 
contaminated noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 1 .OE-03. 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste ?anks 
September 2007 4-6 
azard and Accident Analysis 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
Contaminated Liquidsludge: The potential exists for liquid/sludge to be inadvertently 
released during solidification operations due to a loss of tank integrity from corrosion. 
Section 3.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates a spill of aqueous solutions (Le., slurries), at a 3-m fall 
distance, has a bounding R value of 4.OE-05. 
4.4.2 High-Wind Entrainment 
Contaminated Soil: Because carbon steel is stable at a high pH and a significant amount of 
liquid remains in the south tank, it is believed that the tank has not leaked. However, for 
conservatism, it is assumed that the tank has leaked and contaminated a 0.3-m-thick layer of 
soil equal to the footprint of the tank (1 0.9 m in length by 3.5 m in diameter) or 12.3 m3 of 
contaminated soil. The soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 
4.OE-03 g/m2-h, or 3.2E-02 g/m2-8h. (Note: An 8-hour exposure is selected consistent with 
DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.) 
Equation 1 was used to calculate the entrainment R value of 6.3E-08 for this scenario. 
R = ARF X RF = [(SER)(SA)(T)]/[(p)(SV)] 
where: 
SER = soil entrainment rate obtained from Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002), 4.OE-03 g/m2-h 
SA = surface area of contaminated soil = 40.3 m2 
T = time interval over which soil is exposed to wind (8 hours) 
P = assumed soil density of 1 .7g/cm3 or 1.7E+06 g/m3 
SV = contaminated soil volume = 12.1 m3. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: The 11 6-C-3 waste site contains no contaminated 
combustible solids. Contaminated combustible solids would, in all likelihood, be limited to used 
PPE contained in drums. The amount of contamination present on used PPE is anticipated to 
be minimal. A high-wind event could resuspend freshly deposited surface contamination, but 
the bulk of the waste will be protected from high winds by the waste drum. Section 5.2.4 of 
DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for this waste form is 4E-5/hrY or 3.2E-04 for an 
8-hour duration. 
Contaminated oncombustible Solids: Only loose contamination on the surfaces of 
noncombustible solids would be available for entrainment by high winds (i.e., not combined with 
or embedded in the surface matrix). The majority of the surface contamination, on 
noncombustible solids, is expected to be in the form of a scale that, in all probability, is strongly 
affixed to the pipe or tank surfaces. The inventory in this form, potentially subjected to high 
wind entrainment, is anticipated to be minimal. Section 5.3.4 of DOE (2000) indicates that the 
bounding R value for the entrainment of a sparse population of loose surface Contamination 
from a noncombustible surface is 4E-5/hr, or 3.2E-04 for an 8-hour duration. (Note: An 8-hour 
exposure is selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.) 
Contaminated Liquid/Sludge: Liquid/sludge inadvertently released from the waste tanks may 
be entrained by wind during solidification activities. Liquid/sludge or solidified material 
remaining in the tanks is protected from entrainment by wind. Section 3.2.4.5 of DOE (2000) 
indicates that the bounding R value for an outdoor pool at low wind speeds is 4E-7/hrY or 
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3.2E-06 for an 8-hour duration. (Note: An 8-hr exposure is selected consistent with 
DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.) 
4.4.3 Explosion (Flammable GaslAir Mixture Deflagration) 
Contaminated Solidified Matrix: The pressure rise generated by a flammable gadair mixture 
deflagration during remediation activities could cause a resuspension of contaminated partially 
solidified or fragmented material from within the tank. However, large amounts of fuel 
(hundreds of pounds or more) are generally required for a flammable gadair mixture to form an 
unconfined cloud within the fuel's flammable limits that then subsequently explodes. Such 
amounts of fuel will not be present during remediation activities. The tanks could potentially 
serve as a confining space for a flammable gaslair mixture, but they are vented to atmosphere. 
If a deflagration were to occur within a tank, a small amount of contaminated, partially solidified 
material could be resuspended. Section 4.3.2.2 of DOE (2000) states that pressure impulses 
generated by an explosive event that may entrain and hurl aggregate materials will not result in 
significant airborne releases unless aggregate materials are hurled at considerable velocities. It 
is estimated that the contaminated material that could be resuspended is negligible; therefore, 
contaminated solidified matrix materials are not considered further in this calculation. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids expected to be present 
during remediation activities of the 11 6-C-3 tanks are limited to used PPE, which may be stored 
in drums near the waste site. Used PPE will have minimal contamination and does not provide 
a rigid surface for pressurized gases to act upon. DOE (2000), Section 5.2.2.3, states that the 
bounding R value for this scenario is 1 E-3. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Small amounts of contaminated noncombustible 
solids, such as piping, will be exposed during remediation activities. The majority of the surface 
contamination on noncombustible solids is expected to be in the form of a scale that is strongly 
affixed to the pipe or tank surfaces. Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding 
R value for the release of pressurized gases over contaminated, noncombustible materials is 
2E-03. 
Contaminated Liquid/Sludge: It is possible that a deflagration could occur within a tank during 
solidification activities. However, because the amount of flammable gases will be relatively 
small and the tanks are vented to atmosphere, the potential damage is anticipated to be low. It 
is believed that most of the partially solidified liquidlsludge or solidified material in the tanks 
would not be affected by a deflagration in the headspace. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) 
indicates that the bounding R value for an overall vessel failure would be 4E-5. Given that the 
waste site consists of tanks that will be mostly underground throughout remediation activities, it 
is believed that this value is very conservative. 
4.4.4 Vehicle/Excavator Impact 
Contaminated Soil/Pulverized Solidified Matrix: A vehicle or excavator impact to 
contaminated soil or the contaminated soil pulverized solidified matrix could result in 
resuspension of the material. However, only a small fraction of the potentially contaminated 
volume could be affected. Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is not directly applicable to this 
scenario due to the physical differences between the experimental conditions (powder placed 
on a plywood sheet or in a quart can within a vented metal box) and the tank remediation 
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activities, but it does provide a reference point. The bounding R value in Section 4.4.3.3.2 of 
DOE (2000) is 2E-3. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids expected to be present 
during remediation activities of the 11 6-C-3 tanks are limited to used PPE, which may be stored 
in drums near the waste site. Used PPE will have minimal contamination. Vehicle/equipment 
impact to packaged contaminated PPE could result in a failure of the drum and suspension of 
surface contamination. Section 5.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) states that the bounding R value for this 
scenario is 1 E-4. 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids, such as piping, 
will be exposed during remediation activities. Contaminated particles adhering to the surface of 
the noncombustible solids would be subject to release by impact due to the resultant flexing of 
the solid. The majority of the surface contamination on noncombustible solids is expected to be 
in the form of a scale that is strongly affixed to the pipe or tank surfaces, and most of this will, in 
turn, be protected from impact by at least 0.6 m (2 ft) of soil. Section 5.3.3.2.2 of DOE (2000) 
indicates that the bounding R value for impact to contaminated noncombustible materials that 
do not brittle fracture is 2E-03. 
Contaminated LiquidlSludge: It is possible that an impact to a tank could occur during 
solidification activities. However, because the bulk of the tanks will remain underground, any 
impact is expected to be limited to the top section of a tank. It is expected that most of the 
unsolidified liquid/sludge or solidified liquid/sludge in the tanks would not be affected by an 
impact. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for an overall 
vessel failure would be 4E-5. Given that overall vessel failure would probably not occur as a 
result of an impact, it is believed that this value is very conservative. 
4.4.5 Fire 
Contaminated Soil or Solidification Matrix: The area surrounding the 11 6-C-3 site consists 
of cobbles without significant amounts of vegetation. The contaminated soil or contaminated 
solidification matrix associated with the 1 1 6-C-3 remediation is noncombustible. Fire is judged 
to result in an insignificant release. 
Contaminated Combustible Solids: Combustible solids expected to be present during 
remediation activities of the 11 6-C-3 tanks are limited to used PPE, which may be stored in 
drums near the waste site. PPE will have minimal amounts of contamination. Section 5.2.1 . I  of 
DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for packaged contaminated combustible 
materials that are heated/burned is 5E-04. This value was judged to be bounding for conditions 
under consideration (e.g., ignition of the soft waste from an external source such as a range fire 
or an internal source such as a ve 
Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: A fire could eject some of the contamination from the 
metal tank or pipe surfaces due to flexing of the solid surface. Tanks, piping, structural 
components, concrete, underground transfer lines, etc., will be size reduced utilizing cutting 
torches, hydraulic shears, grinders, snippers, wire saws, or by mechanical disassembly, as 
applicable. Section 5.3.1 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for this event is 
6E-05. It is expected that only a small fraction of the total inventory would be subject to release 
by this mechanism. 
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Bounding 
Vehicle Fire Value Dumping Entrainmenta Deflagration 
Contaminated Liquid/Sludge: A potential initiator of an onsite fire could be ignition of gasoline 
or diesel from the excavator. It is possible for the pipinghanks to be heated by a fire and, as a 
result, the unsolidified liquid/sludge contents could also be heated. It is anticipated that the 
energy input from a worst-case fire would be insufficient to result in boiling of the liquids. 
Section 3.2.1 . I  of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for heating of shallow pools 
of aqueous solutions is 3E-05, which is based on experiments involving ml volumes of solution 
in a shallow steel dish. While this is not directly applicable to the situation of heating 34,800 L 
(9,193 gal) of liquid/sludge, it does provide a reference point. The R value for heating of the 
liquid/sludge would be expected to be significantly less than 3E-05. 
Liq u id/s I u dg e 
Contaminated 
com bustibles 
Con tam hated 
noncom bustibles 
4.4.6 Summary of Release Values 
I 
4E-5 3.OE-6 4E-5 <4E-5 <<3E-5 4E-5 
Negligible 3.OE-4 1 E-3 1 E-4 5E-4 1 E-3 
1 E-3 3.OE-4 2E-3 2E-3 6E-5 2E-3 
The results of the assessment of respirable ARFs from the 11 6-C-3 remediation activities are 
summarized in Table 4-2. The bounding value for each material form is the largest R value 
(ARF x RF) for any of the release mechanisms. 
Table 4-2. Assessment o Results of Respirable Airborne Release F 
I Release Mechanism 1 Mat 
1 E-6 I 2E-7 1 <<;ZE-3 1 <<2E-3 1 Negligible I 1E-6 3 u I 11 acIa I e/ lsoldification matrix I 
a Entrainment rates based on an 8-hour duration. 
Nearly all of the radiological inventory associated with the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Storage Tanks is 
expected to be in the form of contaminated liquid/sludge contained within the tanks solidified or 
unsolidified, depending on the remediation stage. The inventory associated with the other two 
waste forms (combustible and noncombustible) is expected to be orders of magnitude less. 
Based on the bounding R value determined for each waste form and the potential radiological 
inventory associated with each form, it is believed that a bounding R value of 4E-5, as 
determined for liquid/sludge, is a reasonably conservative value to apply to the entire inventory 
of the tanks for FHC purposes. It is recognized that some events, particularly those involving 
contaminated combustibles and contaminated noncombustibles, can produce higher values. 
Conversely, some events involving contaminated soil would produce smaller values. However, 
the higher release events would only affect a small fraction of the total inventory. 
4.5 NUCLEAR CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT 
A criticality screening for the 1 16-C-3 remediation activities has been completed and is 
documented in Remediation of the 1 16-C-3 Underground Sludge Tanks, Criticality Evaluation 
No. 01 00C-CE-N0005, latest revision (see BHI 2004a for Rev. 0). The fissile isotopes listed for 
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this site did not (either individually or as sum-of-the-ratios) exceed the subcritical activity 
threshold limits of NS-1-2.2, "Criticality Safety Reviews." The evaluation concluded that neither 
criticality limits nor controls were needed, and that there are no normal or credible abnormal 
conditions that could lead to an uncontrolled nuclear event (criticality). 
4.6 FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION 
The hazards evaluated in the FHC calculation are identified in Section 4.4. The bounding 
accident scenario analyzed for this site is a dumping or deflagration scenario with an R value of 
4E-05. Fire events and seismic events are assumed to have no impact on the contaminated 
soil or the solidified material. The FHC calculations are summarized below. See Appendix C 
for calculation details. 
Only radionuclides were used in determining the FHC because there are no other hazardous 
materials that exceed the 29 CFR 191 0 or 40 CFR 68 TQs; therefore, analysis of chemical 
constituents was not included in the FHC calculation. The hazard Category 3 TQs in 
DOE-STD-1027-92 (DOE 1997) are based on the release values (RV) calculated in EPA (1 989). 
Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water 
ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most 
restrictive RV. The TQ can be expressed as: 
The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
1. The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to 
drinking water (see EPA 1989, Appendix B.1) 
2. The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are 
inversely proportional to a respirable airborne release fraction (see EPA 1989, 
Appendices A.2 and C.i). 
3. The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source. 
The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, 
NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002), allows that the hazard Category 3 TQs for radionuclides for which 
the food pathway and the inhalation pathway are limiting may be revised if, based on the 
physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources for the facility and its 
hazardous materials, the credible release fractions (airborne release fractions) can be shown to 
be significantly different from the values used in the EPA Technical Background Document 
(EPA I 989). All potential accident scenarios must be considered under unmitigated conditions. 
All pathways must be considered and the most limiting pathway must be used. 
Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002), the adjusted Category 3 TQ for an isotope 
in a particular material form can be expressed as shown in equation 2: 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 4-1 1 
Hazard and Acciden 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
where: 
fl 
RVFOOD 
f2 
RVWATER 
WNH 
f3 
RVDIR 
= the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA 1989, Exhibit A-1) to the largest respirable airborne release 
fraction from any potential accident 
= the release value for the food pathway from EPA (1 989), Appendix E 
= the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA 
analysis (Le., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water 
in any potential accident scenario 
= the release value for the water pathway from EPA (1 989), Appendix E 
= the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA (1 989), Appendix E 
= the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 m to the dose rate from a 
distributed source of equal activity at 30 m 
= the release value for the direct exposure pathway from EPA (1 989), 
Appendix E. 
The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a 
hazard analysis. This FHC will be based on the hazard analysis in Appendix B and the scenario 
analyses presented in Appendix C. These analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate 
respirable airborne release fractions. Equation 2 was used to generate adjusted TQs for each 
constituent present at the burial ground. 
The inventories for each constituent were divided by the adjusted TQ values. These individual 
ratios were then summed and compared to 1. If the sum of the ratios was above 1, using the 
adjusted TQ, then the adjusted TQ has been exceeded and the FHC for the waste site is 
determined to be Category 3. If the sum of the ratios is below 1, the FHC is determined to be 
below Category 3. 
Using the adjusted TQ values as described above, the final sum-of-the-ratios for the 1 16-C-3 
Chemical Waste Tanks is identified in Table 4-3. The sum-of-the ratios for this site is below 1 ; 
therefore, the FHC for this site is below Category 3 (radiological). 
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Material at 1027 Category 3 
Ratio TQREVISED 
Risk 
(Ci)" (Ci)" 
Table 4-3. Maximum Su m-of-the-Ratios. 
Am-241 
e-1 4 
4.1 E-01 5.2E-01 1.3E+01 3.2E-02 
1.7E-03 4.2E+02 3.OE+03 5.8E-07 
CO-60 
CS- I 37 
2.2E-02 2.8 E+02 2.8E+02 7.8E-05 
2.4E+00 6.OE+01 I .3E+03 1.9E-03 
Eu-1 52 
Eu-I 54 
I H-3 1 4.1E-03 1 1.6Et-04 1 1.2E+05 I 3.5E-08 
2.8E-03 2.OE+02 7.OE+02 4.OE-06 
3.3E-03 2.OE+02 8.4E+02 3.9E-06 
I Ni-63 I 6.9E+00 I 5.4E+03 1 1.4E+06 I 5.1E-06 
Pu-238 
P~-239/240 
8.6E-03 6.2E-01 1.6E+01 5.6E-04 
1.8E+00 5.2 E-0 1 I .3E+01 1.4E-01 
I Pu-241 1 1.8Et-00 I 3.2E+01 I 8.OE+02 I 2.2E-03 
- 
U-233/234 4.7E-03 4.2E+00 1 .I E+02 4.5E-05 
U-238 4.8E-03 4.2E+00 1 .I E+02 4.6E-05 
I Sr-90 I 7.8E+00 I 1.6E+01 I 4.1E+03 I 1.9E-03 
I Y-90d I 7.8E+00 I 1.4E+03 I 3.6E+05 I 2.2E-05 
Sum of Ratios:l 1.7E-01 
MAR was obtained from Determination of Material at Risk (MAR) for 116-C-3, 
0100C-CA-NOOI I , Rev. 0 (BHI 2005d). 
Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
Revised TQ values obtained from the FHC presented in Appendix C using bounding 
release fraction of 4E-05. 
Yttrium-90 is assumed to be secular equilibrium with its parent strontium-90. Barium- 
137m is also in secular equilibrium with its parent cesium-I 37, but because there are 
no EPA release values reported in Technical Background Document to Support Final 
Rulemaking Pursuant to Section I02 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act: Radionuclides (EPA 1989), this radionuclide was not 
included in the FHC calculation. 
EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
FHC = final hazard categorization 
MAR = material at risk 
TQ = threshold quantity 
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CONTROLS AND COMMIT TS 
Special controls are derived from the assumptions made in the FHC that are required to ensure 
that the FHC remains valid. These controls will be incorporated into the appropriate work 
implementing instructions developed for the project. The controls identified in this document will 
be in place throughout the entire remediation process, as applicable. 
The special controls for the remediation efforts pertaining to 11 6-C-3 are as follows: 
1. The waste forms encountered at this site are limited to liquids/sludges, solidified 
liquidlsludge, Contaminated tank and pipe surfaces, contaminated combustibles (e.g., PPE), 
concrete, and contaminated sail. 
2. The bulk (2 90%) of the inventory (Le., activity) is in the form of contaminated liquid/sludge, 
steel, and soil. 
3. The total inventory is less than or equal to the inventory assumed in the analysis as 
documented in the FHC presented in Appendix C. 
If any condition listed below is encountered, the situation will be treated as a discovery under 
the FHC evaluation process as described in Section 1.4: 
0 
0 
0 
Waste forms found that are different than those as identified above 
Total inventory is determined to be more than what was assumed 
Less than 90% of the inventory (Le., activity) is in the form of liquid/sludge, steel, and soil. 
5.1 PROJECT-SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
Project-specific controls are established for the protection of workers that apply specifically to 
the activity under consideration. These controls are derived from the hazard evaluation and 
engineering judgment. These controls will be flowed down into the appropriate work 
implementing instructions developed for the project. Based on the hazard evaluation, the 
following project-specific controls have been identified: 
0 In the event of a windstorm or an emergency at a co-located facility occurring during 
remediation activities, worker safety will take precedence over all remediation activities and 
workers will be evacuated from the site. 
0 Dust suppressants/fixative will be used, as appropriate. 
0 Appropriate workplace air monitoring will be performed and health and safety controls 
implemented, as specified in the SS HASP, RWP, site-specific instructions, or any other 
approved document. 
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5.2 PROGRAMMATIC CONTROLS 
5.2.1 Conduct of Operations 
Conduct of Operations is imposed to ensure that work is performed in a controlled and 
organized manner, that all facets of remediation activities have been considered, and that the 
necessary documentation is maintained. 
Conduct of Operations strongly emphasizes technical competency, workplace discipline, and 
personal accountability to ensure a high level of performance during all activities. If conflict 
arises between instructions or directions, work shall be safely stopped until resolution is 
achieved. Safety is the first priority, and all planning shall include appropriate safety analyses to 
identify potential safety and health hazards and the methods needed to appropriately control 
these hazards. Workers will not start work until approved safety procedures, instructions, and 
directions are provided for nonroutine operations. 
Conduct of Operations requires workers to be alert and aware of conditions affecting the job 
site. Operators and workers conducting field activities should be notified of changes in the work 
area status, abnormalities, and difficulties encountered in performing project operations. 
Similarly, operators and workers shall notify the chain of command of any unexpected 
situations. In accordance with the severity of a finding (Le., emergency condition), notification 
requirements will be expanded to include upper tier management and regulatory agencies. 
5.2.2 Training 
The WCH Environmental Safety and Health Training Program provides workers with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to safely execute assigned duties. A graded approach is used 
to ensure that workers receive a level of training commensurate with their responsibilities in 
accordance with applicable requirements. 
Formal and informal safety and health training and education are essential to help employees 
recognize the hazards of their jobs. Particular emphasis is placed on understanding hazards 
associated with jobs and the potential effects on employees; ensuring that employees follow 
rules, procedures, and work practices; and that employees know how to respond to an 
emergency. Training and education programs are maintained current to ensure that both 
management and employees understand and recognize the hazards to which they are exposed. 
Employees receive both formal and informal training. Formal training includes Hanford General 
Employee Training, New Hire Orientation, project-specific training, and on-the-job training. The 
Hazardous Material Management and Emergency Response (HAMMER) training facility 
provides numerous training and education opportunities for WCH employees. Mockup training 
is also used in preparation for conducting potentially high-hazard activities. 
Safety of operators and crane operations is enhanced by operator training (only trained and 
qualified operators that meet the subcontractors safety plan and training requirements are 
allowed to operate heavy equipment and cranes) and periodic maintenance and inspection of 
the heavy equipment and cranes in accordance with the site safety plan and procedures. The 
specific training requirements for subcontractors performing hoisting and rigging on construction 
projects is outlined in Submittal 01 OOB-SC-G001~-5-~7-01 By Exhibit G, Section II, Construction 
Safety & Health Requirements, Subsection CR-06, Hoisting and Rigging. 
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Radiological control technicians must complete and be current in radiological control technician 
qualification training. These training courses require the successful completion of examinations 
to demonstrate understanding of theoretical and practical classroom material. 
Specialized training will be provided, as needed, to instruct workers in the use of nonstandard 
equipment, in the performance of abnormal operations, Safety Basis controls, and in the 
hazards of specific activities. Specialized training may be provided by on-the-job training 
activities, by classroom instruction and testing, or by pre-job briefings. The depth of training in 
any discipline will be commensurate with the degree of hazard involved and the knowledge 
required for task performance. 
Some site remediation project activities will require the acquisition of expert services, as 
opposed to project staff training. 
In addition to fundamental training, managers, supervisors, and team leads are provided with 
the WCH Supervisor Development Program. 
Line managers, supervisors, team leads, and facility personnel participate in facility drills, 
investigations, and critiques. Information from the critiques is shared with employees to improve 
emergency response. Additional training is also provided for the building emergency directors 
and facility emergency response personnel. 
Because of the nature of activities conducted at the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
Remediation Project, various administrative controls will be implemented to ensure that only 
individuals with the appropriate training and authorization are allowed access within the site. 
Personnel who have unescorted access to the 116-C-3 site must meet special training 
requirements (Le., 24-Hour Hazardous Worker Training, Radiological Worker I1 training, pre-job 
briefing, and required site and activity-specific reading). These training requirements provide 
adequate assurance of worker safety. 
5.2.3 Configuration Control 
Established configuration/change control processes ensure that proposed changes are 
reviewed in relation to the specified commitments. If discovery indicates a breach of these 
commitments, work will cease so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be identified and 
implemented, as appropriate. WCH off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process 
and protocol applicable to such a discovery. NS-1-2.1 defines the FHC evaluation process and 
requirements for facilities that have a FHC of below category 3. 
5.2.4 Quality Assurance 
The WCH Quality Assurance Program Description (QAPD) (WCH, 2006a) is written to comply 
with the requirements of DOE 0 41 4.1 B, Quality Assurance; Title 10 CFR 830, Subpart A, 
"Quality Assurance Requirements"; and the quality assurance requirements of the Hanford 
Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement). Both the referenced 
DOE Order and the CFR comprise 10 quality criteria that must be met. Additional or specific 
requirements originating from the Tri-Party Agreement are annotated as such. Consideration 
was also given to DOE G 414.1 -2, Quality Assurance Management System Guide, in the 
preparation of the QAPD. 
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5.2.5 Occupational Safety and industrial Hygiene 
Remediation activities at the 11 6 4 - 3  waste site will be controlled by the SS HASP, as required 
by established WCH procedures. A HASP will be written for the 1 16-C-3 Chemical Waste 
Tanks Remediation Project to address the health and safety hazards of each phase of site 
operation and will include the requirements of a site HASP for hazardous waste operations 
and/or construction activities, as specified in 29 CFR 191 0.1 20. 
Before work begins, a pre-job briefing is held with the affected workers. This briefing will include 
reviews of the hazards that may be encountered and the associated requirements. Throughout 
an activity, daily briefings may also be held, as well as special briefings before major evolutions. 
Potentially significant nonradiological hazards expected during the 1 1 6-C-3 Chemical Waste 
Tanks Remediation Project might include the following: 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
e 
Asbestos exposure 
Carcinogen exposure 
Exposure to biological hazards (insect and snake bites) 
Exposure to corrosive materials 
Exposure to hazardous chemicals 
Exposure to reactive materials 
Exposure to temperature extremes 
Flammability hazards 
Hot work, if required 
Kinetic energy hazards (e.g., working in close proximity to moving equipment) 
Lead exposure 
Noise 
Polychlorinated biphenyl exposure 
Possible exposure to organic and inorganic chemicals 
Soil slope instability 
Toxic material exposure 
Uneven working surfaces 
Working at heights 
Working in close proximity to moving equipment 
Working in confined and subgrade spaces. 
5.2.6 Emergency Management 
The WCH Emergency Management Program (including preparedness, planning, and response) 
is described in detail in SEM-2, Emergency Management Program, and contains the 
administrative responsibilities for compliance with the Hanford Emergency Management Plan 
(DOE-RL 1999). The 11 6-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Project will be managed under the 
Operational Emergency Base Program. 
All emergency planning and preparedness activities for the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
Remediation Project will be consistent with planning and preparedness actions undertaken by 
other Hanford Site contractors and similar projects. Activities will be in a manner that ensures 
the health and safety of workers and the public and the protection of the environment in the 
event of an abnormal incident or emergency at the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks. 
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Project response to any emergencies (Le., project or neighboring project incident) will be to 
evacuate personnel to a safe location and initiate the required responsibilities of the Building 
Warden and other project personnel in support of the Incident Command System. 
The WCH Emergency Management Program is based on a graded approach and is 
commensurate with the hazards and consequences associated with the projects/facilities and 
activities managed by WCH (involving radioactive and nonradioactive hazardous materials) 
and/or neighboring facilities. 
5.2.7 Radiological Control Program 
The Radiological Control and Protection Program is defined in DOE-approved programs and 
WCH-approved procedures. This program implements WCH policy to maintain radiological 
exposures to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and to ensure adequate 
protection of workers. The WCH Radiological Protection Program meets the requirements of 
10 CFR 835. Radiological material handling will be managed in accordance with WCH 
Radiological Control Manual (RCM) (WCH 2006b), RC-1, and RC-100 through RC-300. 
Appropriate dosimetry, radiation work permits, PPE, ALARA planning, periodic surveys, and 
Radiological Control (RadCon) technical support will be provided. 
The RCM provides guidance at the WCH and subcontractor management level for compliance 
with the requirements of 10 CFR 835, DOE orders, contractual requirements, and management- 
directed radiological actions. 
The RCM is intended to ensure that unnecessary, unplanned, and accidental radiation 
exposures are avoided, and individual and collective radiation exposure to workers and the 
general population and the release of radioactive material to the environment are maintained 
ALARA. The scope of the RCM is limited to occupational radiation protection. Environmental 
radiation protection is beyond the scope of the RCM. The plans, programs, schedules, and all 
WCH activities shall be in compliance with 10 CFR 835 as specified in the approved WCH 
Radiation Protection Program (BHI 2000). 
Site-specific radiological controls in the form of the technical assessment, RWP, and 
environmental radiological task instruction will be adhered to during remediation activities. 
The ALARA planning process will identify shielding requirements, contamination control 
requirements (including local ventilation controls, if applicable), radiation monitoring 
requirements, and other RadCon requirements for the individual tasks conducted during the 
course of the 11 6-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks Remediation Project. 
5.2.8 Hazardous Material Control 
The WCH Hazardous Material Control Program is addressed at both the programmatic level 
and at the site-specific level. The WCH Safety and Health Program manual, SH-1, is the top- 
tier safety and health document that establishes requirements and provides guidelines to 
minimize health and safety risks to workers and the public. The program-level manual and 
implementing procedures contained in SH-I , Safety and Health , are intended to ensure that all 
elements of a health and safety program for hazardous waste operations are met. 
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Hazardous waste sites are evaluated to identify site-specific hazards, including identification of 
hazardous materials, and to determine the appropriate health and safety control procedures 
needed to protect employees from identified hazards in accordance with 29 CFR 191 0.1 2O[c] 
and 29 CFR 1926.65(c). 
Appropriate site control procedures are developed during the planning stages of hazardous 
waste cleanup operations to control employee exposure to hazardous substances. These 
procedures shall be modified as necessary when new information becomes available in 
accordance with 29 CFR 191 0.1 20(d) and 29 CFR 1926.65(d). 
The WCH shall institute engineering controls and work practices to reduce and maintain 
employee exposure ALARA below the permissible exposure limits (PELs) for substances 
regulated by 29 CFR 191 0 (to the extent required by Subpart Z) or the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) , whichever is more 
protective, except when such controls and practices are not feasible. Controls and work 
practices are described in RC-200 and SH-1 (see RC-I -1 0.2, "ALARA Program Description"). 
Whenever engineering controls and work practices are not feasible or are not required, any 
reasonable combination of engineering controls, work practices, and PPE shall be used to 
reduce and maintain employee exposures to levels at or below the OSHA PEL for substances 
regulated by 29 CFR 191 0 (to the extent required by Subpart Z) or the ACGIH TLVs, whichever 
is more protective. (see 29 CFR 191 0.1 20[g] and 29 CFR 1926.65[g]). 
Monitoring shall be performed in accordance with 29 CFR 191 0.1 20(h), 29 CFR 1926.65(h), 
RC-200, and SH-1 , Section 4.0, Industrial Hygiene, where there may be a question of employee 
exposure to hazardous concentrations of hazardous material. Monitoring shall be performed to 
verify the proper selection of engineering controls, work practices, and PPE so that employees 
are not exposed to levels that exceed the OSHA PEL or ACGIH TLV (or published exposure 
levels, if there are no assigned PELs or TLVs for the substance) (see 29 CFR 1910.120[h] and 
29 CFR 1926.65[h]). 
The WCH shall ensure that employees, contractors, and subcontractors (or their 
representative[s]) engaged in hazardous waste operations are informed of the nature, level , and 
degree of exposure that is likely as a result of participation in such hazardous waste operations. 
Hazardous materials requiring specialized controls (e.g. , materials contaminated with lead, 
beryllium, cadmium) will be handled in accordance with PAS-I , Project Activities and Support, 
PAS-2, Integrated Work Control Program, and SH-I , Section 4, Industrial Hygiene, which 
address their unique hazards and regulatory requirements. Hazardous substances, 
contaminated liquids, and other residues shall be handled, transported, labeled, and disposed of 
in accordance with 29 CFR 191 O.IZO(j); 29 CFR 1926.65(j); WMT-I , Section 1 .O, Waste 
Management; and WMT-1 Section 2.0, Transportation. 
5.2.9 Fire Protection 
WCH and its subcontractors are committed to support a level of fire protection and fire- 
suppression capabilities that are sufficient to minimize losses from fire and related hazards 
consistent with the best class of protected property in private industry. Therefore, WCH has 
implemented the following fire protection measures: 
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0 Contractually mandated fire protection criteria identified in DOE orders and federal, state, 
and local requirements 
e A comprehensive fire and related hazards protection program for facilities sufficient to 
minimize the potential for the following: 
- The occurrence of a fire or related event 
- A fire that causes an onsite or offsite release of hazardous or radiological material that 
will threaten the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment 
- Vital DOE programs suffering interruptions as a result of fire and related hazards 
- Property losses from a fire and related events exceeding defined limits established by 
DOE. 
The WCH overall fire protection policy is stated in SH-1-5.1, Fire Protection . Specific Fire 
Protection Program elements are also described in SH-1-10.6, Fire Protection. The WCH Fire 
Protection Program complies with the appropriate requirements of applicable CFR and National 
Fire Protection Association criteria as well as the additional requirements of DOE Headquarters 
and Richland Operations Office directives included in the River Corridor Closure Contract. 
The fire protection implementing procedures are grouped into five major areas: (1) 
management and administration, (2) fire protection design, (3) fire protection systems, (4) fire 
prevention procedures, and (5) special hazard protection procedures. 
5.2.1 0 Surveillance and Maintenance 
Surveillance of the remediation activities at the 11 6-C-3 site will be performed. These 
surveillance activities may include the following: 
Planning, scheduling, and performing independent assessments of waste site activities to 
provide feedback to WCH management regarding compliance status and performance 
Verifying that the site's quality program meets the requirements of applicable regulations, 
DOE orders, and contractual requirements 
Administering the process for evaluating and reporting potential Price-Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988 noncompliances. 
QA-1-17', "Surveillance," describes the process for scheduling, preparing, performing, 
documenting, responding to, and closing surveillances in accordance with the requirements of 
DOE 0 414.1 C, Quality Assurance, and 10 CFR 830, Subpart A, "Assessment." 
Surveillances may be scheduled or unscheduled. When scheduled surveillances are 
performed, the appropriate individuals shall be notified in advance and a time shall be 
scheduled for the surveillance. When unscheduled surveillances are performed, the personnel 
and line management being surveilled shall be informed, as soon as possible, that surveillance 
will be performed. 
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5.2.1 1 Work Controls 
Worksite analysis is used to provide the means to successfully identify and control safety issues 
in the workplace. This requires that a hazard analysis be performed for all new processes, 
material, or equipment before use. It also ensures that surveys, reviews, self-inspectionsJ 
and/or regular examinations of processes and individual jobs are routinely conducted. 
Programmatic worksite controls include, but are not limited to, the following: 
Activities will be conducted in accordance with the subcontractor's material handling plan, 
SS HASP, and the WCH Radiological Control Program. 
The employee job task analysis supports the collection of potential hazard and exposure 
data necessary for a risk-based approach to employee medical monitoring. 
The RadCon group completes comprehensive surveys and trends the results of monitoring 
activities in areas where employees work. 
Industrial hygiene technicians perform personal and area exposure sampling and 
monitoring. 
An integrated team with representation from affected craft(s), Field Engineering, Safety, 
Industrial Hygiene, RadCon, and other professionals conduct a job hazard analysis of work 
in the planning stage. This is to ensure that all hazards are identified and that the 
appropriate work methods are used to further reduce the risk to workers and the 
environment. The job hazard analysis consists of job screening, data gathering, field 
walkdown, and group discussion of the hazards noted. 
Prior to release of the subcontract documents, a pre-job safety meeting is held with the 
project team. Craft and supervision discuss the activities and ensure that the proper 
controls are in place prior to commencing work. If problems are found with the subcontract 
documents, the package is revised. 
Each day, prior to start of work, a plan-of-the-day meeting is held to discuss those portions 
of the subcontract documents that will be performed during the upcoming shift. Craft and 
supervisors carefully plan work in accordance with the subcontract documents, SS HASP, 
RWP, and other control documents. 
Self-inspections shall be performed that are conducted at the project and functional level, 
including inspections of fire extinguishers and emergency spill kits, housekeeping 
inspections, fire inspections, respiratory protection inspections, facility surveillances, and 
operations inspections. 
During remediation activities, site-specific work controls will include the following elements: 
e A SS HASP will identify the hazards and necessary controls for protection of the workers. 
0 A trench box will be used to stabilize the excavation prior to personnel entry, if required. 
0 When piping or tank contents could potentially be exposed, workers will use the PPE 
specified by the SS HASP and RWP. 
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Piping will be cut using extended-reach equipment such as remotely-operated shears 
mounted on an excavator. The extended-reach equipment will not be positioned over any 
tanks, only between the tanks. 
Only trained equipment operators will be used. 
The work environment will be maintained in a compliant state in accordance with the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
Containment will be provided, as appropriate 
Dust-suppression techniques (fixatives) will be applied, as necessary, to control fugitive 
dust. 
The size of the excavation will be limited to the minimum dimensions necessary to conduct 
remediation activities safely. 
Field safety oversight personnel (Industrial Hygiene and RadCon safety specialists) will be 
provided during excavation and remediation activities. 
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116-C-3 REMEDIATION 
HAZARD IDE TIFICATION TABLE 
A.l 116-C-3 CHEMICAL TANKS HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION 
The hazard identification table has six columns; the column headings and contents are 
described as follows: 
Column 1 - Hazard Type. This column identifies the following types of hazards investigated: 
radiological (including radioactive material and direct radiation), fissile material, hazardous 
chemicals, biohazards, asphyxiates, flammable/combustible material, reactive material, 
explosive material, electrical energy, thermal energy, kinetic energy, noise, seismic, high wind, 
and water intrusion. 
Column 2 - Location. This column describes the location of the hazard. 
Column 3 - Form. This column specifies the form of the hazard type. This column is not 
intended to provide a detailed identification of the chemical (e.g., oxide) or physical form of the 
hazard type (e.g., crystalline). Such detail is not considered at the hazard identification stage of 
a safety analysis. 
Column 4 - Quantity. This column quantifies the hazard. Measured values are presented 
when relevant and available. A "U" in this column indicates that the sampling result for the 
contaminant of interest was not statistically above background. 
Column 5 - Remarks. This column presents information that provides a better understanding 
of the hazard type, location, form, and quantity. 
Column 6 - References. This column lists the information sources used to identify the 
location, form, and quantity of a given hazard type. 
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No radiological data for the north 
tank exist; however, field 
radiological measurements 
collected during confirmatory 
sampling indicated no significant 
detectable radiological activity. As 
a measure of conservatism, the 
concentrations for liquid in the 
south tank have been applied to 
the north tank. 
1 Eu-154 I 3.3E-03 
~ U-233/234 I 4.6E-03 
Isotope 
H-3 
Quantity (Ci) 
1.4E-03 
CO-60 
Ni-63 
2.1 E-02 
6.9E+00 
Sr-90 
Y-90 
cs-137 
Eu-152 
7.7E+00 
7.7E+00 
1 .OE+OO 
2.8E-03 
Table A-1 . 11 6-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location Quantity Remarks References 4azard Type Form 
.iquid at bottom of tank. 
-here is no sludge in the north 
an k. 
ladioactive 
naterial 
lorth tank: 
02,200- L 
27,000-gal) 
ubgrade tank 
i t h  associated 
liping and vents 
icated adjacent 
3 C Reactor. 
The north tank currently holds 
approximately 2.5 cm (1 in.) of liquid 
at the tanks bottom, which equates 
to approximately 1,276 L (337 gal) 
of liquid. 
Partial Remaining 
Sites Verification 
Package for the 
I 164-3, Chemical 
Waste Tanks, 
attachment to 
CCN 112493 
(BHl 2005) 
South tank: 
02,200-L 
27,000-g al) 
ubgrade tank 
vith associated 
Iiping and vents 
ocated adjacent 
o C Reactor. 
-iquid. Isotope Quantity (Ci) The south tank is currently filled to 
one-third of capacity, which equates 
to approximately 34,070 L 
(9,000 gal) of a liquid/sludge 
mixture. 
Sample No. J024M8, collected 
1 1 /30/04. 
Partial Remaining 
Sites Verification 
Package for the 
I 164-3, Chemical 
Waste Tanks, 
Table B-1 , 
attachment to 
CCN 112493 
(BHI 2005) 
H-3 
C-14 
CO-60 
Sr-90 
cs-137 
U -23 3/2 34 
U-238 
2.OE-03 
7.1 E-04 
3.3E-04 
8.7E-02 
1.1 E+OO 
1.2E-04 
1.3E-04 
SI u d g e/sol i ds . For the south tank, an estimated 
378.5 L (1 00 gal) of sludge is 
present. 
Pa rtia I Re ma ining 
Sites Verification 
Package for the 
I 16-C-3, Chemical 
Waste Tanks, 
Table B-1, 
attachment to 
CCN 112493 
(BHI 2005) 
C-14 I 7.8E-04 
Sample No. J024M8-A, collected 
1 1 /30/04. 
Hazard Type 
U-238 
P u - 2 3 9/2 4 0 
Pu-241 
Am-241 
Pu-238 
Isotope 
U-235 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Am-241 
qadioactive 
naterial 
continued) 
4.7E-03 
1.8E+00 
1.8E+00 
4.1 E-01 
8.6E-03 
Quantity (Ci) 
7.62E-04 
1.09E-01 
2.66E+00 
5.66E-01 
7.51 E-01 
_ _ _ ~ ~  
=issionable 
materials 
Hazardous 
chemicals 
Table A-I . 11 6 4 - 3  Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location 
North and south 
tanks: 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
each, subgrade 
tanks with 
associated pi ping 
and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-g al) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Form 
3uried, partially buried, and 
zxposed; inner and 
(potentially) outer surface, 
fixed and removable 
zontamination on pipes and 
tanks, residual liquids in pipes 
and tanks, and as tank heel. 
Buried, partially buried, and 
exposed; inner and outer 
surfaces with fixed and 
removable contamination on 
pipes and tanks, residual 
liquids in pipes and tanks, and 
as tank heel. 
Contaminated soil and 
pipe/vessel contents. 
Quantity 
Arsenic 0.004 kg 
Barium 130 kg 
Cadmium 27 kg 
Chromium 735 kg 
Lead 183 kg 
Silver 0.001 kg 
Sodium 19,342 kg 
Remarks 
___ 
The referenced criticality evaluation 
s for the sampling activities and is 
3eing revised to reflect the criticality 
mpact resulting from the 
remediation activities as part of the 
Jocumented safety analysis. 
~~ ~ 
Of these chemicals, the only item 
with a reportable quantity listed in 
40 CFR 302.4 is sodium with a 
reportable quantity of 454 kg 
(1,000 Ib). There are no 
29 CFR 191 0 highly hazardous 
chemicals, nor are there any 
40 CFR 68.1 30 regulated toxic 
substances documented for this 
site. Addition of chemicals could 
cause release of toxic fumes and/or 
heat. 
References 
Remediation of the 
Underground 
Storage Tanks, 
Criticality 
Evaluation No. 
Rev. 1 (revision in 
progress) 
116-C-3 
01 00C-CE-N0005, 
Determination of 
Material at Risk 
(MAR) for 1 16-C-3, 
(BHI 2005a) 
01 00C-CA-NO01 1 
Table A-1 . 11 6-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
~ 
TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Hazard Type 
Zarcinogens 
I Location 
Biohazards TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Asphyxiates TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Form 
Sontaminants in soil and 
Dipehessel contents. 
Insect/rodent bites and 
excrement. 
Venomous insects and 
animals. 
Heavier-than-air gasses. 
Quantity 
There are no carcinogens 
documented for this site. 
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 Ib) 
Propane: 400 L (1 06 gal) 
Remarks 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in the construction 
industry. 
The potential for the collection of 
asphyxiate gasses to dangerous 
concentrations is credible because 
of the subgrade nature of the 
f aci I ity . 
References 
3e te rmina tion of 
Waterial at Risk 
'MAR) for 1 16-C-3, 
:BHI 2005a) 
100C-CA-NOOl l 
4azard Type 
'lammable 
iaterials 
Corrosives 
Table A-1 . 11 6-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location 
-wo 102.200-L 
27,000-gal) 
ubgrade tanks 
vith associated 
)iping and vents 
ocated adjacent 
o C Reactor. 
rwo i 0 2 , 2 0 0 - ~  
27,000-gal) 
ubgrade tanks 
with associated 
Aping and vents 
ocated adjacent 
o the C Reactor. 
TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Form 
lange fire or onsite fire. 
Aiscellaneous combustibles. 
%els and oils. 
~ 
Liquids in tanks and pipes. 
Quantity 
vlinimal quantities of vegetation 
2nd combustible materials within 
site boundary. 
Jndefined quantities of 
Zombustibles on vehicles. 
materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the 
project. Estimated quantities are 
as follows: 
Gasoline 190 L (50 gal) 
Diesel 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil 
Paints, cleaners, 
solvents or 
adhesives: 
Acetyl e ne : 
Antifreeze: 
Brake fluid: 
Hydraulic/ 
transmission 
fluid: 760 L (201 gal) 
Propane: 400 L (1 06 gal) 
(2,008 gal) 
570 L (151 gal) 
380 L (1 00 gal) 
2.8E+04 L 
(7,397 gal) 
450 L (1 19 gal) 
19 L (5 gal) 
Unknown quantities of 50% NaOH 
and 10% HNO3 were sent to these 
tanks (see hazardous chemicals). 
Remarks 
~ 
A range fire would not cause a 
significant release of hazardous 
substances due to the lack of 
combustibles, especially vegetation, 
within the remediation site. 
Miscellaneous combustible 
materials include pieces of plastic, 
wood, cloth, and other types 
generated during remediation. 
Fuels and oils are found in vehicles 
brought onsite as part of the 
remediation activities. 
These materials will not be stored 
close to the site. 
The high pH measured in the 
1 16-C-3 waste (1 3.2) would indicate 
that the HNO3 has been neutralized. 
References 
-- 
Estimated 
quantities based 
on ERC Chemical 
I nve nto ry 
Database for 
1 00-B/C 
iazard Type Form 
Gasoline and diesel fuel. ixp I osive 
naterials 
3eactive 
iazards 
Zlectrical 
3nergy 
Thermal 
energy 
Table A-I  . 11 6-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location 
16-C-3 
emediation site. 
rwo I 02 ,200-~  
27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
ivith associated 
iiping and vents 
ocated adjacent 
:o the C Reactor. 
- 
rwo i 0 2 , 2 0 0 - ~  
:27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
Jvith associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to the C Reactor. 
TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
I ocat ed adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
'ropane and other 
)ressurized gas bottles. 
3adiolytic decomposition of 
vater creating hydrogen gas. 
Solids and liquids. 
3upply lines outside of the 
3xcavation fence for office 
:railers and analytical needs. 
Lightning 
Extreme temperatures. 
Quantity 
~ 
Jndefined quantities. Quantities of 
lasoline and diesel fuel will be kept 
o the minimum needed to support 
he project. 
3eactive hazards are not expected 
:o be currently present at the waste 
site; however, reactive hazards 
:e.g., grout, additives) brought on 
site for treatment of tank contents 
nay  be reactive. 
No dedicated lines will be brought 
to the site. If electrical service is 
required, a portable generator will 
be brought to the site. There are 
230-Kv lines within 100 m of the 
site. 
Undefined quantities. 
NIA 
Remarks 
3asoline and diesel fuel is present 
n various vehicles onsite (e.g., 
leavy machinery used for 
?xcavation or transport). 
-or propane and other pressurized 
jas bottles, see the kinetic and 
iotential energy hazard type. 
4n explosion could cause some 
2mount of contaminated soils to be 
suspended in air and be readily 
xeathable to a downwind receptor 
3r initiate a fire (see the hazardous 
Zhemicals hazard type). 
See remarks for flammability and 
kinetidpotential energy hazard 
types. 
Lightning could initiate a fire. These 
hazards are routinely encountered 
in industry. 
Temperature extremes range from 
-29 to 46°C (-20 to 115°F). These 
hazards are routinely encountered 
in industry. 
References 
4azard Type Location I 
3netic and 
otential 
lnergy 
Table A-1. 116-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
rwo i 0 2 , 2 0 0 - ~  
:27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
Nith associated 
iping and vents 
icated adjacent 
3 C Reactor. 
Two 102,200-L 
27,000-gal) 
iubgrade tanks 
vith associated 
iiping and vents 
ocated adjacent 
o C Reactor. 
1 16-C-3 
*e m edi at i on sit e. 
Form 
'ressurized gas bottles (e.g., 
lxy-acetylene). 
:ailing loads/equipment used 
luring remediation activities. 
iircraft collision. 
ieavy equipment/ 
nac hi n e ry/ve h icle impacting 
he tanks, piping, or 
:ontaminated soil. 
4 filled waste drum being 
dropped a vertical distance. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the 
Iroject. 
Jndefined quantities 
Jndefined quantities. 
4ccumulation of hydrogen gas is 
?of expected because the tanks 
m d  pipelines have been vented 
during the last year. 
Undefined quantities. 
Remarks 
4 pressurized missile could strike a 
latch of contaminated soil, which 
Nould result in a release of material. 
4 falling load could cause a puff- 
:ype release of contaminated soils. 
i e a v y  machinery may collide with 
the tanks causing contaminated 
Darticles to be released into the air. 
The probability of this type of event 
is extremely low, especially given 
the small footprint of this site. An 
aircraft collision would cause 
contaminated soils to be suspended 
in air. There would also be a 
potential for a fire to result from the 
crash (see flammability hazard type 
for fire) to become airborne. 
Sparks generated during rupturing 
of tanks/pipes may result in 
com b ust ion of h yd rog en/oxyg e n 
mixtures, causing venting of the 
tanks. This hazard requires a 
sufficient concentration of hydrogen, 
which is unavailable because the 
tanks have been vented to the 
atmosphere. 
For those drums containing 
contaminated waste, it is assumed 
that a drop would be insufficient to 
cause a total ejection of the drum 
contents. A drum would have to be 
open for dispersion of contents to 
occur. Such a rupture is not 
anticipated to result in a large 
airborne release due to the 
relatively small fraction of inventory 
represented by the volume of a 
single drum. 
References 
dazard Type 
doise 
Water 
ntrusion - 
1 at u ral 
ihenomenon 
Table A-1. 116-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location 
'wo 102,200-L 
27,000-gal) 
ubgrade tanks 
iith associated 
liping and vents 
icated adjacent 
3 C Reactor. 
'wo 102,200-L 
27,000-g al) 
ubgrade tanks 
vith associated 
Iiping and vents 
x a t e d  adjacent 
o C Reactor. 
Form 
Aachinerylequipment. 
-looding 
=iainwater/snow and ice. 
Liquids used for dust or fire 
suppression or addition of 
liquids for treatment. 
Quantity 
Jndefined quantities of machinery 
)resent. 
Undefined quantities. 
Remarks 
These hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
Spread of contamination could 
occur; however, the arid-to-semiarid 
climate and the high permeability of 
the soil suggest that little, if any, 
surface water will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most precipitation 
is lost through evapotranspiration. 
Consequently, little water remains 
to generate surface runoff. 
The arid-to-semiarid climate 
suggests that little, if any, water 
accumulates within the excavation. 
Most precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In addition, the 
transmissive nature of the Hanford 
Site surface soils allows rapid 
infiltration of precipitation. 
Consequently, little water remains 
to generate surface runoff. 
The transmissive nature of the 
Hanford Site surface soils allows 
rapid infiltration of water. 
References 
Hazard Type 
Seismic - 
iat u ral 
ihenomenon 
High wind - 
natural 
phenomenon 
Tornado - 
natural 
phenomenon 
Table A-1 . 11 6-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location 
-wo 102,200-L 
27,000-gal) 
;ubgrade tanks 
vith associated 
iiping and vents 
ocated adjacent 
o C Reactor. 
Two 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Form 
>ontaminated soil and 
i i p ehessel contents. 
Probable maximum wind. 
Contaminated soil and 
pipehessel contents. 
Quantity 
'he volume of contaminated soil, 
ipe  scale, and vessel contents at 
isk for the excavation site. 
'eak gusts have been recorded at 
30 mph at 15.2 m (50 ft) above 
jrade. Such extreme gusts have 
lot exceeded a full day in duration. 
_ _ ~  ~~ ~ 
Jndefined quantities. 
Remarks 
-ailing debris, equipment, and 
ieavy machinery could impact 
:ontaminated soil/tanks and result 
n a puff-like release. 
The severity of a seismic event at 
he Hanford Site is not anticipated 
o result in significant impacts to 
subgrade waste site structures. 
The effects of a seismic event on 
:he Hanford Site or other facilities 
2nd projects would be much more 
Significant than those 
zonsequences that would occur at 
[he 116-C-3 site (see the kinetic 
znergy hazard type). 
Contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air and readily 
breathable to a downwind receptor. 
Could cause debris to be thrown (a 
missile) causing a kinetic energy 
hazard. 
A tornado could suspend 
contaminated soils in air, which 
would make them readily respirable 
to a downwind receptor. 
Could cause debris to be thrown (a 
missile) causing a kinetic energy 
hazard. 
References 
Hazard Type 
rxposure - 
nternal 
Aptake 
- 
A-I . 11 6 4 - 3  Chemical Tanks Remediation Hazard Identification Table. (9 Pages) 
Location 
TWO 102,200-L 
(27,000-gal) 
subgrade tanks 
with associated 
piping and vents 
located adjacent 
to C Reactor. 
Form 
:ontaminated soil and 
3ipe/vessel contents. 
Quantity 
See quantities for the radiological 
hazard type. 
Remarks 
During remediation activities, 
contaminated soil or tanWpipe 
contents will be handled in various 
ways., Soils or tanWpipe contents 
may be spilled causing these 
materials to adhere to soil particles, 
which could be suspended in air. 
Movement of workers and vehicles 
across contaminated soil may also 
result in an airborne release leading 
to an internal uptake. 
References 
Initial Hazard 
Categorization for 
the 11643-3 
Underground 
Storage Tanks, 
(BHI 2004) 
01 00C-CA-NO008 
WCH-207 
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APPENDIX B 
116-C-3 CHEMICAL TANKS REMEDIAT 
HAZARD EVALUATION TABLE 
B.1 GENERAL METHODOLOGY 
All events that could result in a potential release of hazardous substances were evaluated using 
the following approach: 
Events were grouped into three categories: OperationaVinternal events, natural phenomena 
events, and external/man-made events. 
Events that were not applicable (flooding due to probable maximum flood, failure of 
engineered ventilation or filtration systems) were noted as not applicable (N/A). 
Frequency, consequence, and risk rankings were not assigned for events (e.g., loss of 
power to equipment) that could not result in a release of hazardous substances. These 
events are noted as not evaluated (N/E) in the corresponding columns. 
Consequence and risk rankings were not assigned to events with an assigned unmitigated 
frequency of D, beyond extremely unlikely. N/E is noted in the corresponding columns. 
B.2 FREQUENCY RANKS 
Frequency ranks were assigned using the following guidelines and the event frequency rank 
chart shown in Table B-I.  
The frequency of the initiating event is the unmitigated frequency. 
Initiating events that involved human error were assigned an unmitigated frequency rank 
of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of an active component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of a passive component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of B. 
Fire initiators involving use of an ignition source (e.g., vehicle exhaust systems, compressed 
gas torches) were assigned a frequency rank of A. 
Frequency assigned to natural phenomenon events assigned consistent with frequency of 
applicable evaluation basis event. 
Events that would not result in a potential release of hazardous substances (e.g., loss of 
power caused by vehicle accident) were not evaluated for frequency. 
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t 
Anticipated A 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
May occur several times in the life of the facility >I  E-02 
Table 5-1. Event Frequency Ranks. 
Extremely unlikely 
Beyond extremely unlikely 
Term 
C 
D All other events <I E-06 
Probably will not occur in the life of the facility 1 E-06 to 1 E-04 
1 Rank 1 
Term Rank Dose Range 
High 1 >25 rem TEDE 
Description 
Concentration Range 
>ERPG-2REEL-2 
Frequency Range I (yr-1) 
- ~ _ _  ~ 
Moderate 2 1 to 25 TEDE ERPG-I/TEEL-1 to ERPG-2TTEEL-2 
Low 3 0.1 to 1 rem TEDE <ERPG-IREEL-I to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
Negligible 
1 Unlikely 
4 ~ 0 . 1  rem TEDE <ERPG-l/TEEL-I 
Not anticipated to occur during the life of the 1 B j facility 
Term Rank Dose Range 
High 1 >IO0 rem TEDE 
Moderate 2 25 to 100 rem TEDE 
Low 3 1 to 25 rem TEDE 
Negligible 4 <I remTEDE 
~~ 
1 1 E-04 to 1 E-02 
Concentration Range 
>ERPG-3/TEEL-3 
ER PG -2REEL-2 to E R PG-3/TEEL-3 
<ERPG-I REEL-1 to ERPG-2/TEEL-2 
<ER PG-I REEL-1 
8.3 CONSEQUENCE RANKS 
Consequence ranks for the public, co-located worker, and facility worker were assigned based 
on anticipated unmitigated dose using the charts shown in Tables B-2 through B-4. For events 
that were assigned a frequency of beyond extremely unlikely (event frequency D), the 
consequences were not evaluated. 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline 
TEDE = total effective dose equivalent 
TEEL = temporary emergency exposure limit 
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Hazard Evaluation Table 
Moderate 
Low 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
2 
3 
Significant exposure (A 00 rem TEDE or severe injury) 
Moderate exposure (10 to 100 rem TEDE, reversible health effects) 
acility Worker Consequence Ranks. 
Negligible 
Term 
4 <Low 
I Rank 1 
A B 
Exposure to Radioactivity or Other Hazardous Materials 
Characterization 
C D 
I High I I I Severe exposure resulting in prompt fatality I 
8.4 RISK RANKS 
Unmitigated frequency and consequence ranks were used to determine unmitigated risk ranks 
in accordance with B-5. 
Table B-5. Risk Ranks. 
1 I 
3 I Ill I Ill I IV I IV I 
4 I IV I IV I IV I IV I 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
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Table B-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (1 1 Pages) 
- 
tem 
Prevention and Mitigation Unmitigated Ranking Summary 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk Location Ad m in is t rat ive Initiator 
'ublic: 3 
:acility worker: 3 
:oloc. worker: 3 
'ublic: IV 
'acility worker: IV 
:oloc. worker: IV 
4ccess control, 
'PE for 
,ersonnel, 
-adiological 
:ontrols, spill 
'esponse 
xocedures, 
ERC 
Zmergency 
Management 
?rogram (P&M) 
- 
loils, 
xposed 
inks, and 
iping within 
i e  11 6-C-3 
ite 
'ublic: C 
:acility worker: C 
:oloc. worker: C 
t is not anticipated that a 
seismic event impacting 
he Hanford Site will have 
;uff icient energy to result 
n the shifting of soil 
;lopes. The soil slopes at 
he 11 6 4 - 3  site will be 
;uff iciently moist to 
xevent cascading of soil 
2nd undermining of slope 
3ases. Any minimal 
2mount of contaminated 
just that would be made 
3irborne due to a seismic 
went or from after effects 
(e.g., falling equipment, 
werturned vehicles) 
would be bounded by 
high-wind hazards. 
High winds or a tornado 
would disturb soil surfaces 
andsuspend 
contaminated particles 
into the air. Airborne 
contamination could 
readily spread from the 
remediation area to onsite 
receptors. The probability 
of a tornado impacting the 
1 16-C-3 site is assessed 
as being beyond 
extremely unlikely. 
The ref ore, further 
consideration is not 
required. 
3adiologica1, 
issionable 
naterials, 
iazardous 
:hemicals, 
:arcinogens, 
:orrosives, and 
eactive materials 
3xposure. Kinetic 
ind potential energy 
iazards. 
eismic 
vent 
iigh wind/ 
ornado 
- 
2. 
-- 'ublic: I l l  
-acility worker: I l l  
:oloc. worker: IIIII 
Access control, 
dust- 
suppression 
procedures, 
PPE for 
personnel, 
radiological 
controls, ERC 
Emergency 
Management 
Program (P&M) 
Soils, 
3xposed 
anks, and 
iiping within 
he 11 6-C-3 
;ite 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
naterials, 
qazardous 
chem icals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. Kinetic 
and potential energ) 
hazards. 
'ublic: A 
-acility worker: A 
>oloc. worker: A 
'ublic: 3 
-acility worker: 3 
3oloc. worker: 3 
- 
tem 
3. 
- 
Table B-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (1 1 Pages) 
Initiator 
mow/ash 
lading 
Location 
;oils, 
xposed 
mks, and 
liping within 
l e  11 6-C-3 
ite 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
ladiological, 
ssionable 
iaterials, 
azardous 
hemicals, 
arcinogens, 
orrosives, and 
eactive materials 
lxposure. Kinetic 
[nd potential energy 
iazards. 
Event Description 
4sh and/or snow would 
Iury contaminated soil, 
anks, and piping. There 
Ire no structures whose 
ailure would result in 
significant releases of 
:ontaminated soil. 
mpacts resulting from 
2quipment collapsing 
mder the weight of snow 
m d  ash would be minimal 
3s the significant layers of 
snow and ash would 
entrap the majority of any 
inventory that would be 
expected to be released 
from soil or from a 
breached tank or pipe. 
Because there is no 
evidence of any lava, 
mud, or ashflows reachinc 
the Pasco Basin within thc 
recent past, and the 
nearest volcano is more 
than 97 km (60 mi) from 
the Hanford Site, volcanic 
activity is considered 
unlikely to impact the 
Hanford Site. 
Unmitigated Ranking 
Frequency 
'ublic: D 
'acility worker: C 
:oloc. worker: C 
Consequence 
'ublic: 3 
:acility worker: 3 
:oloc. worker: 3 
Risk 
'ublic: IV 
:acility worker: IV 
:oloc. worker: IV 
~~ ~ 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
-- 
Ad m in is trati ve 
!RC 
Imergency 
vlanagement 
'Togram (M) 
tem 
- 
4. 
- 
5. 
- 
Table B-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (11 Pages) 
Initiator 
'otential 
npacts 
rom other 
acilities and 
Iffsite 
tctivities 
Aircraft 
impact 
Location 
;oils, 
txposed 
mks, and 
liping within 
?e 116-C-3 
ite 
Soils, 
Sxposed 
tanks, and 
piping within 
the 11 6-C-3 
site 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
3adiologica1, 
issionable 
naterials, 
iazardous 
:hemicals, 
:arcinogens, 
:orrosives, and 
.eactive materials 
2xposure. Kinetic 
2nd potential energy 
iazards. 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
materials, 
hazardous 
chemicals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. Kinetic 
and potential energ) 
hazards. 
Event Description 
'otential energy sources 
ind associated accidents 
)eyond 100 m (328 ft) 
rom the 11 6-C-3 site are 
:onsidered to have no 
npact. Review of hazard 
tssessments and safety 
malyses for nearby 
acilities in the 100 Area 
jetermined that there are 
io accident scenarios that 
:ould occur at these 
acilities that would result 
n a release from the 
I 16-C-3 site. 
Evaluation of the boundinc 
iccidents involving the 
.elease of contaminated 
naterial at the 11 6-C-3 
site determined that 
subsequent evacuation of 
:he 116-C-3 site would not 
-esult in unacceptable 
joses, as there are no 
xitical monitored processes 
that require the presence 
Df personnel. 
Based on DOE-STD-3014 
an aircraft crash at the 
1 16-C-3 waste site is 
considered beyond 
extremely unlikely. 
Therefore, further 
consideration is not 
required. 
Unmitigated Ranking 
Frequency 
"ublic: C 
-acility worker: C 
;oloc. worker: C 
Public: D 
Facility worker: D 
Coloc. Worker: D 
Consequence 
'ublic: 3 
'acility worker: 3 
>oloc. worker: 3 
Public: NE 
Facility worker: NE 
Coloc. Worker: NE 
Risk 
3ublic: IV 
-acility worker: IV 
2oloc. worker: IV 
Public: NE 
Facility worker: NE 
Coloc. Worker: NE 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
-- 
Administrative 
iRC 
:mergency 
danagement 
'rogram (M) 
ERC 
zmergency 
Management 
?rogram 
- 
Table 6-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (11 Pages) 
- 
tem 
Unmitigated Ranking Prevention and Mitigation Summary 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
Event Description Location Affected Hazard Frequency Consequence Risk Administrative initiator 
6. 'ehicle 
npact 
;oils, 
xposed 
Inks,  and 
iping within 
ie 11 6-C-3 
ite 
qadiological, 
issionable 
naterials, 
iazardous 
:hem icals, 
:arcinogens, 
:orrosives, and 
,eactive materials 
sxposure. Kinetic 
2nd potential energy 
iazards. 
/chicles falling into the 
?xcavation site could 
esult in airborne 
;uspension of 
:ontaminated soil. 
qupturing of fuel tanks 
:odd result in a fire (see 
tem 8 for possible effects 
i f  a range fire, and item 9 
or possible effects of an 
insite fire). 
'ublic: A 
-acility worker: A 
:oloc. worker: A 
'ublic: 3 
-acility worker: 3 
:oloc. worker: 3 
'ublic: I l l  
'acility worker: I l l  
>oloc. worker: Ill 
Dust- 
suppression 
procedures, 
access control, 
PPE for 
personnel, 
radiological 
controls, fire 
protection 
procedures. 
7. 
- 
3ange fire ;oils, 
!xposed 
snks, and 
iiping within 
l e  116-C-3 
,ite 
3adiologica1, 
'issionable 
naterials, 
iazardous 
:hem icals, 
=arcinogens, 
Zorrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. Kinetic 
and potential energy 
hazards. 
3ange fires or small fires 
;tarted at the waste site 
nay ignite miscellaneous 
:ombustible materials, 
ncluding pieces of plastic, 
Nood, vegetation, cloth, 
2nd other combustibles 
jenerated during 
?emediation. Also, fuels 
2nd oils found in vehicles 
Jvould be available to 
Dropagate a fire. The fire 
:odd result in a release oi 
iazardous substances via 
entrainment or from the 
combustion of 
contaminated flammable 
materials. A fire may also 
result in an explosion (see 
item 11 for causes of an 
explosion). A fire may 
result in an internal missilc 
(see item 12 for causes of 
internal missiles at a 
waste site). See item 9 fo 
discussion of fire impact 
within the 116-C-3 site. 
'ublic: A 
-acility worker: A 
2oloc. worker: A 
'ublic: 3 
-acility worker: 3 
2oloc. worker: 3 
'ublic: Ill 
-acility worker: Ill 
>oloc. worker: Ill 
Good 
housekeeping 
practices, 
access control, 
fire protection 
procedures, 
restriction on 
open-flame use, 
storage 
requirements, 
Emergency 
Management 
Program (for 
range fires) 
Dust 
suppression 
(e.g., soil 
cement, water) 
Passive 
physical barriers 
defining the 
sampling and 
remediation 
area restrict the 
spread of fire 
from impacting 
staged drums 
tem 
- 
8. 
- 
9. 
- 
Table 6-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (11 Pages) 
initiator 
Insite fire 
.ightning 
Location 
Soils, 
?xposed 
anks, and 
iiping within 
he 11 6-C-3 
site 
Soils, 
exposed 
tanks, and 
piping within 
the 11 6-C-3 
site 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
qadiological, 
issionable 
naterials, 
iazardous 
:hemicals, 
:arcinogens, 
:orrosives, and 
*eactive materials 
3xposure. Kinetic 
wid potential energy 
iazards. 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
materials, 
hazardous 
chemicals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. Kinetic 
and potential energy 
hazards. 
Event Description 
4 fire occurring within the 
uaste site may entrain 
sxposed contaminated soil 
3t the site. 
The probability of a 
lightning strike directly to 2 
waste site is significantly 
below the probability of 
1 x 10-6/yr. However, 
lightning can initiate a 
range fire, which can 
impact waste sites. See 
item 8 for a discussion of 
the impacts of a range fire 
Unmitigated Ranking 
Frequency 
'ublic: B 
'acility worker: B 
2oloc. worker: B 
Public: D 
Facility worker: D 
Coloc. worker: D 
Consequence 
Public: 3 
Facility worker: 3 
Coloc. worker: 3 
Public: NE 
Facility worker: NE 
Coloc. worker: NE 
Risk 
'ublic: I l l  
'acility worker: I l l  
2oloc. worker: I l l  
Public: NE 
Facility worker: NE 
Coloc. worker: NE 
Prevent ion and Mitigation 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
-- 
-- 
Adm i n is t rat i ve 
Good 
housekeeping 
practices, 
access control, 
fire protection 
procedures, 
restriction on 
open-flame use, 
storage 
requirements, 
Emergency 
Management 
Program 
Good 
housekeeping 
practices, 
access control, 
fire protection 
procedures, 
storage 
requirements, 
Emergency 
Management 
Program (for 
range fires) 
tem 
- 
10. 
- 
11. 
Table B-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (11 Pages) 
Initiator 
Zxplosion 
nternal 
nissiles 
Location 
;oils, 
bxposed 
Inks, and 
liping within 
l e  11642-3 
ite 
soils, 
?xposed 
anks, and 
Iiping within 
he 11 6-C-3 
;ite 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
3adiologica1, 
'iss iona bl e 
materials, 
iazardous 
;hem icals, 
:arcinogens, 
;orrosives, and 
reactive materials 
Sxposure. Kinetic 
snd potential energ) 
hazards. 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
materials, 
hazardous 
chemicals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. Kinetic 
and potential energ! 
hazards. 
Event Description 
4n explosion could occur 
I t  the site causing 
:ontamhated soil to be 
.eleased into the air. The 
?xplosion may also initiate 
I range fire (see item 7 for 
he consequences of a 
.ange fire). 
>ossible causes: 
Jeflagration of flammable 
jas/air mixtures due to 
squipment failure and/or 
iuman error; bottles of 
wessurized flammable 
jases at the remediation 
site; accumulation of 
?ydrogen/oxygen mixture 
Jvithin the tanks, followed 
~y deflagration. 
An internal missile may 
strike a patch of 
eontaminated soil resultins 
in a puff-like release. 
Possible causes: 
punctured container of 
pressurized gas, and a fire 
melting the release valve 
of a bottle of pressurized 
gas. 
Frequency 
'ublic: C 
'acility worker: C 
>oloc. worker: C 
"ublic: C 
'acility worker: C 
2oloc. worker: C 
Unmitigated Ranking 
Consequence 
'ublic: 3 
:acility worker: 3 
:oloc. worker: 3 
'ublic: 3 
'acility worker: 3 
>oloc. worker: 3 
Risk 
'ublic: IV 
-acility worker: IV 
>oloc. worker: IV 
'ublic: IV 
=acility worker: IV 
2oloc. worker: IV 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
_- 
-- 
Ad m in ist rat ive 
Good 
housekeeping 
practices, 
access control, 
fire protection 
procedures, 
restriction on 
open-flame use, 
storage 
requirements, 
Emergency 
Management 
Program (for 
range fires) 
Venting of 
tanks' pipelines 
Good 
housekeeping 
practices, 
access control, 
fire protection 
procedures, 
restriction on 
open-flame use, 
pressurized 
container 
storage 
requirements, 
Emergency 
Management 
Program 
Dust 
suppression 
Table 6-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (11 Pages) 
- 
item 
- 
12. 
- 
13. 
- 
14. 
- 
Summary Unmitigated Ranking 
- 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk Ad m in ist rat ive initiator 
ieavy load 
lrop 
!quipment 
npact 
duclear 
xiticality 
Location 
Soils, waste- 
'illed drums, 
md piping 
vvithin the 
1 16-C-3 site 
Soils, 
exposed 
tanks and 
piping within 
the 11 6-C-3 
site 
3adiologica1, 
'issionable 
materials, 
iazardous 
:hemicals, 
;arcinogens, 
:orrosives, reactive 
materials exposure. 
Kinetic and potential 
energy hazards. 
Public: A 
Facility worker: A 
Coloc. worker: A 
Public: Negligible4 
Facility worker: 3 
Coloc. worker: 3 
Public: IV 
Facility worker: Ill 
Coloc. worker: Ill 
-- lust- 
;uppression 
Irocedures, 
2ccess control, 
>PE for 
iersonnel, 
*adiological 
:ontrols, 
ioisting and 
'ig g i n g 
Iroced u res 
4 heavy load drop may 
;trike a patch of 
:ontaminated soil, tanks, 
i r  pipelines, resulting in a 
luff-like release of 
iirborne inventory. 
'ossible causes: 
iverturned vehicles, falling 
squipment, dropped loads, 
stc. 
4 criticality screening was 
serformed for the 1 16-C-3 
site inventory (01 OOC-CE- 
UOOOS). The screening 
jetermined that over- 
moderation precludes 
xiticality. Further, the 
fissionable materials 
zoncentrations present ar6 
too low to create credible 
xiticality hazard. 
Fissionable 
materials 
Public: D 
Facility worker: D 
Coloc. worker: D 
Public: NE 
Facility worker: NE 
Coloc. worker: NE 
Public: NE 
Facility worker: NE 
Coloc. worker: NE 
-looding 
:aused by 
i re/d ust 
;uppression 
Soils, 
exposed 
tanks, and 
piping within 
the 11 6-C-3 
site 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
materials, 
hazardous 
chemicals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. 
Fire/dust-suppression 
liquids would accumulate 
in a waste site due to 
excessive liquids being 
used to suppress dust or 
fight a fire. 
Excess liquids could result 
in the spread of 
contamination off the 
remediation site. 
Public: C 
Facility worker: C 
Coloc. worker: C 
Public: 3 
Facility worker: 3 
Coloc. worker: 3 
Public: IV 
Facility worker: IV 
Coloc. worker: IV 
4ccess control, 
'ire protection 
srocedures, 
PPE for 
Dersonnel, 
*adiological 
;ontrols, 
3ersonnel 
josimetry 
-- 
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Table B-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (1 1 Pages) 
Unmitigated Ranking Summary P reven t io n and Mitigation 
Systems, 
Structures, 
and 
Components 
Frequency Consequence Risk Administrative Affected Hazard Event Description [em 
- 
17. 
Location 
;oils within 
:ontainers 
vithin the 
1643-3 site 
Initiator 
Zontainer 
,pill 
Eiccess control, 
;pill response 
iroced ures, 
'PE for 
iersonnel, 
*adiological 
:ontrols, 
3ersonnel 
josimetry 
=or the 
2haracterization 
xtivities 
;overed by this 
safety analysis, 
sample 
2ontainers will 
De limited to a 
maximum of 
1.5 kg, unless 
the area being 
sampled is a 
high-radiation 
area, in which 
case the samplc 
mass will be 
limited to 20 g 
?adiological, 
issionable 
naterials, 
iazardous 
:hem icals, 
:arcinogens, 
:orrosives, and 
eactive materials 
3xposure. Kinetic 
ind potential energy 
iazards. 
:ontainer of soil is spilled 
ihile preparing for 
hipment or analysis. 
'ublic: A 
-acility worker: A 
>oloc. worker: A 
'ublic: lVlV 
-acility worker: lllll 
>oloc. worker: Ill 
'ublic: Negligible4 
:acility worker: 3 
Zoloc. worker: 3 
Public: A 
Facility worker: A 
Coloc. worker: A 
>ublic: 3 
=acility worker: 3 
Soloc. worker: 3 
Public: Ill 
Facility worker: I l l  
Coloc. worker: Ill 
-- Dust- 
suppression 
procedures, 
access control, 
PPE for 
personnel, spill 
response 
procedures, 
radiological 
controls, 
personnel 
dosimetry 
18. Soil spill 
(Dumping ) d 
um ping ) 
Soils within 
the 1164-3 
site 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
materials, 
hazardous 
chemicals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. 
Equipment used to 
remove contaminated soil 
results in the unplanned 
dumping (hydraulic hose 
break) of soil. It is 
assumed that the content! 
are in a powder form, are 
suspended in air from the 
energy of the fall, and tha 
the wind will carry the 
airborne material into the 
environment. 
Item 
19. 
Initiator 
Table B-6. Hazard Evaluation Table. (11 Pages) 
Location Affected Hazard 
Spread of 
contaminatio 
n 
Event Description 
Soils, 
exposed 
tanks, and 
piping within 
the 11 6-C-3 
site 
Frequency 
Summary 
Consequence 
Public: A 
Facility worker: A 
Coloc. worker: A 
Radiological, 
fissionable 
materials, 
hazardous 
chemicals, 
carcinogens, 
corrosives, and 
reactive materials 
exposure. 
Rank: 
Public: Negligible 
Facility worker: 
Negligible 
Surface contamination 
and/or contaminated 
material are spread from 
designated areas via 
personnel vehicle 
contam inat ion. 
Unmitigated Ranking 
Frequency Rank: I Consequence 
Coloc. worker: 
Negligible 
Risk 
Risk Rank: 
Public: IV 
Facility worker: IV 
Coloc. worker: IV 
ERC = Environmental Restoration Contractor 
EDPl = Engineering Department Project Instruction 
PFP = Plutonium Finishing Plant 
PPE = personal protective equipment 
Prevention and Mitigation 
Systems, I 
Stiuctures’ I Administrative and 
Components I 
I 
-- Dust 
suppression, 
access control, 
radiological 
controls, PPE 
for personnel, 
personnel 
dosimetry 
Appendix 6 - 116-C-3 Chemical Tanks Remediation 
Hazard Evaluation Table 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
6.5 REFERENCES 
BHI, 2004, Remediation of the 7 76-C-3 Underground Storage Tanks, 01 00C-CE-N005, Rev. 0, 
Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
DOE, I 996, Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, DOE-STD-3014-96, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 B-14 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
FINAL HAZARD CATEGORIZATION CALCUL 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 C-i 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
FHC for the Remediation of the 116-C-3 Chemical Waste Tanks 
September 2007 C-ii 
WCH-207 
Rev. 0 
AZARD CATEGORIZATIO TlON 
CALCULATION COVER SHEE 
Project Title 1 16-C-3 Tank Remediation Job No. 14655 
Area I OO-EVC Area 
Discipline Nuclear/Safety Engineering *Calc. No. 01 00C-CA-NO012 
Subject I 16-C-3 Remediation Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (Revised TQs) 
Computer Program Excel Program No. 2003 
The attached calculations have been generated for a specific purpose and task. Use of these calculations by persons who do not have 
access to all pertinent facts may lead to incorrect conclusions and/or results. Before applying these calculations to your work, the 
underlying basis, rationale, and other pertinent information relevant to these calculations must be thoroughly reviewed with appropriate 
Washington Closure Hanford LLC (WCH) officials or other authorized personnel. WCH is not responsible for the use of a calculation not 
under its direct control. 
Committed Calculation Preliminary [zl Superseded [zl Voided 0 
Rev. 1 Sheet Numbers 1 Originator I Checker 1 Reviewer 1 Approval 1 Date 
0 Cover- I 
Calc. - I 1  T.M. Blakley M. F. Maxson 
Total - 12 
R.R. Lehrschall J. S. Decker 07-27-2005 
SUMMARY OF REVISION 
This calculation was revised to include an additional treatment option for the liquid waste contained within the 116-C-3 tanks. 
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2 
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10 
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Hazard Analysis (continued) 
References 
Inventory of North and South Tanks 
Calculation of Revised TQ Values 
16 12 Section 10.0: S u m  of the Ratios 
18 2.0 Summary of Results: 
19 
20 The 1027 Category 3 sum-of-the-ratios for the 116-C-3 Underground Storage Tank characterization activities is 
21 1.7E-01, which is below 1; therefore, the final hazard categorization for this activity is below Category 3. 
17 
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extremely unlikely. 
Tank High wind event could Fire has the potential to Pressure rise resuling from a Inadvertent spillinglspraying Excavation equipment 
sludgaiquid resuspend tank heat the liquidkludge deflagration of flammable gaslair mixture of liquidrsludge during could breach the tanks 
causing a release of 
contaminated material 
through initiation of a fire 
or dumpinglspilling of 
sludgedliiuid not contained causing a release of 
in tanks. Majority of this 
waste will be prdected 
from high winds due to 
location within below- due to location within tank contents. 
grouting operations. or during grouting 
during remediation activities could cause grouting activities could 
a release of liquidsludge from the tanks occur causing a release of 
prior to or during grouting operations. contaminated materials. 
contaminated materials. 
Majority of waste will be 
protected from heat of fire 
grade tanks prior to below-grade tanks prior to 
Contaminated High wind event could Stored PPE could be Pressure rise resulting from a No significant release of Vehiclaiequipment impac 
Combustible resuspend freshly 
Solids deposited surface during remediation activities could cause this type of solid (e.g., PPE) contaminated PPE could 
primarily in the form of 
personal protective 
equipment (PPE). 
ignited during a fire event deflagration of flammable gadair mixture contaminated materials from to packaged, 
causing a release of 
contamination. Waste contaminated materials. a release of surface contamination. is expected due to high result in a suspension of 
surface area to mass ratio. surface contamination. 
Contaminated, High w'nd event could Fire has the potential to Pressure rise resulting from a Damagddropping of Excavation equipment or 
Noncombustible resuspend freshly heat these solids causing deflagration of flammable gadair mixture contaminated pipe or tank vehicle could impact 
Solids deposited surface a release of contaminated during remediation activities could cause materials could result in a piping and/or tanks 
contamination. Waste materials. Majority of a release of surface contamination. release of surface causing a release of 
primarily in the form of waste will be protected contamination. surface contamination. 
contaminated piping and 
tank structural materials. location below-grade. 
from heat of fire due to 
Bechtei ifanford, lnc. CALCULATION SHEET 
A 
Orlglnator: M.W. Ell1 Date: 3/22/2007 Calc. No.: 0100C-CA-NW12 Rev. No.: 1 
b No.:- Checked: T.J. Rodovsky Date: 0 3- 
lzatlon Calculatlon (Revlsed TQs) sheet No.: 2 of 12 
i 3.0 Purpose 
2 
3 The purpose of this calculation is to determine the Final Hazard Categorization (FHC) for the 1164.3 Underground Chemical Storage Tanks 
4 remediation activities based on the hazard analysis of the proposed activities. 
5 
6 4.0 Assumptlons 
8 The 11BC.3 waste site consists of two (2) 1022WIiter (27,000-galIon) underground tanks. The tanks received wasie solutions from the 
9 1054 Metal Examination Facility (MEF) fuel slug dqacketer (Bokish and Reynolds 1956). 
7 
10 
i 1 The hazards evaluated in this calculation are identified in Appendix A of the Auditable Safety Analysis and Final Hazard Cafegorilafion for the 
12 1764-3 Chemical Tank Remedkfim Activities (BHI 2005b). Release of radiological, chemical, and fissionable materials could potentially 
13 occur due to several initiators, including fire (onsite or range), explosion (deflagration), entrainment due to high winds, dumping or spilling of 
14 sample content, spray release of liquid waste while pumping the material out of the tank for soldification, impact from excavation equipment or 
15 vehicles, fire due to lightning, pressurized gas bottles striking samples or piping, or dumpinglspilling due to seismic activity. Accident 
16 scenarios for entrainment, fire event, explosion, dumpinQbpilling, and vehicle impact are evaluated in this calculation. Assumptions for each 
17 of these events are included in the following table: 
and resuspend 
contaminated contaminated soiVgrout 
have negligible impact on 
24 
25 during remediation 
26 activities. 
2a 
27 
release. While discussec 
in this calculation, releasi 
from aircraft impact is 
considered beyond 
I 
01OOC-CA-N0012_Rev-l_t 16C-3-FHC Revised TQ Values 1122WCalc (2) (Purp-Asswnp-Meltl) 
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I 5.0 Methodology: 
3 Step 1 : Determine contaminated material inventories. 
5 Contaminated material inventories (e.g., sludge, liquid, soil) are from 01 00C-CA-NO01 1 (BHI 2005a). Only radionuclides 
6 are used in determining the FHC; therefore, analysis of chemical constituents is not included in this FHC calculation. 
7 
a 
9 Step 2: Calculate the revised TQ values ( T a d  
2 
4 
10 
11 The hazard Category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) in DOE-STD-1027-94 (DOE, 1997) are based on the release values (RV) 
12 calculated in (EPA, 1989.) Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water 
13 ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most restrictive RV. The TQ, 
14 presented in equation 1, can be expressed as: 
15 
16 
17 
18 The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
19 
20 1) The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to drinking water (see EPA, 1989 
21 Appendix B.l) 
22 2) The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are inversely proportional to a 
23 respirable airborne release fraction (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and Appendix C.1). 
24 3) The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source 
TQ = 20 x MIN { RVFOOD, RVWATER, VINH, RVD~R 1 (1 ) 
25 
26 
27 
2a 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
3a 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE, 2002), allows 
that the hazard Category 3 TQs for radionuclides for which the food pathway and the inhalation pathway are limiting may be 
revised if, based on the physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources for the facility and its 
hazardous materials, the credible release fractions (airborne release fractions) can be shown to be significantly different 
from the values used in the EPA Technical Background Document. All potential accident scenarios must be considered 
under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be considered and the most limiting pathway must be used. 
Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2, the revised Category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular material form, presented in 
equation 2, can be expressed as: 
Where f, is the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA, 1989 Exhibit A-I) to the largest respirable airborne release fraction 
from any potential accident 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA analysis 
(i.e., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water in any potential 
accident scenario 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
RVFOOD 
f2 
RVWATER 
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1 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
L 
3 Step 2: Continued 
4 
5 
6 f3 
7 
8 
9 Appendix E 
10 
1 1  The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard analysis. This final 
12 hazard categorization will be based on the hazard analysis in Roberson (2002) and the hazard event analyses 
13 presented in BHI (2005b). These analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate respirable airborne release 
14 fractions. The release fractions will be from DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE, ZOOO), Roberson (2002), or other analyses 
15 previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be used to generate revised TQs for each constituent present. 
17 The total inventory of radionuclides for the dominant material form, based on the most conservative or appropriate R 
18 value, is compared to the revised TQs for that form using the sum of the ratios. The FHC is based on the resultant 
19 sum of the ratios for that dominant scenario. 
20 
21 For conservatism, this final categorization will assume that f2 is equal to 1 although there is no potential for releases to 
22 drinking water in the vicinity of the waste site. It will also assume that f3 is equal to 1. 
24 The adjustment factor f, can be expressed as: f, = REPA/RHA. 
25 
26 Where, 
28 
29 
30 
31 in this hazard analysis. 
33 In general, the respirable release fraction (R) is the product of the airborne release fraction (ARF) and the respirable 
34 fraction (RF), or R = ARF x RF. 
35 
36 Step 3: Determine the final hazard categorization. 
37 
38 The inventories for each constituent are divided by the revised TQ values. These individual ratios are then summed 
39 and compared to 1. If the sum of the ratios is above 1 using the revised TQ, then the revised TQ has been exceeded 
40 and the FHC for the waste site is determined to be Category 3. If the sum of the ratios is below 1, the FHC is 
41 determined to be below Category 3 or Radiological. 
R'J'INH is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 meters to the dose rate 
from a distributed source of equal activity at 30 meters 
is the release value for the direct exposure pathway from EPA, 1989 RVDIR 
16 
23 
27 
REPA is the respirable release fraction for a hazardous material element (e.g., cobalt, aluminum, strontium) 
from EPA (1 989), Exhibit A-1. 
RHA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous material for the potential hazard identified 
32 
42 
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1 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms 
2 
3 6.1 Dump/SpilUSpray 
5 Contaminated Soil or Grout Matrix: DumpinglSpilling of soil/grout could be initiated by several mechanisms: 1) operator loss of 
6 control of an excavator bucket during the loadout of the soiVpulverized grout matrix; or 2) spilling and resuspension of grouted 
7 material during tank shearing operations. The respirable ARF for dumpinglspilling used in Roberson (2002) Attachment 4 is 
8 1 .OE-06. Therefore, the respirable release fraction (R value) used for dumping or spilling of contaminated soil/pulverized grout 
9 is 1 .OE-06. 
10 
i I Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids expected to be present during remediation activities of 
12 the 116-C-3 tanks are limited to used PPE, which may be stored in drums near the waste site. Used PPE will have minimal 
13 contamination and has a high surface area to mass ratio. Consequently, they would generate little force during impact with 
14 surfaces. DOE (2000), Section 5.2.3.1, states that no significant suspension of surface contamination is postulated for such 
15 materials. Therefore, dumping of contaminated, combustible solids is not considered further in this calculation. 
4 
16 
17 
18 Contaminated. Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids, such as piping, will be excavated from the waste 
19 site during remediation activities. The solids may be lifted out of the excavation and dropped resulting a release of surface or 
20 internal contamination. Only loose contamination on the surface of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release (i.e., 
21 not embedded or combined with the surface matrix). The majority of the surface contamination on noncombustible solids is 
22 expected to be in the form of a scale which strongly adheres to the pipe or tank surfaces. DOE (2000), Section 5.3.3, 
23 addresses free-fall-spill and impaction stress to such solids. The bounding R value for shock-vibration of contaminated, 
24 noncombustible materials that do not undergo brittle fracture is 1 .OE-03. 
26 Contaminated Liauid/Sludae: The potential exists for liquid/sludge to be inadvertently released during grouting operations due 
27 to a loss of tank integrity from corrosion. Section 3.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates a spill of aqueous solutions (i.e., slurries), 3- 
28 m fall distance, has a bounding R value of 4.OE-05. 
30 The potential exists for liquid/sludge to be inadvertently released (pressurized spray release) during the pumping of the waste 
31 material from the tank to a solidification process outside the tank using a low pressure pump and pipinglhose assembly 
32 operating at 5 50 psig. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates a pressurized spray release of aqueous solutions has a 
33 bounding R value of 4.OE-05. 
34 
35 6.2 High WindEntrainment 
37 Contaminated Soil: Due to the high pH and the amount of liquid still left in the south tank, it is believed that the tank has not 
38 leaked, However, for conservatism, it is assumed that the tank has leaked and contaminated a 0.3-m thick layer of soil equal 
39 to the foot print of the tank (10.9 m in length x 3.7 m in diameter) or 12.1 m3 of contaminated soil. The soil entrainment rate 
40 used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h, or 3.2E-02 g/m2-8h. INote: An 8-hour exposure is selected 
41 consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.1 Equation 3 was used to calculate the entrainment R value of 
42 6.3E-08 for this scenario. 
43 
25 
29 
36 
44 R = ARF X RF = [(SER)(SA)(T)I/I(p)(SV)] (3) 
45 Where: 
47 SER - Soil entrainment rate obtained from Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) 4.OE-03 g/m2-h 
48 SA - Surface area of contaminated soil = 40.3 m2 
49 T - Time interval over which soil is exposed to wind (8 h) 
50 p - Assumed soil density of 1 .7g/cm3 or 1.7E+06 glm3 
51 SV - contaminated soil volume = 12.1 m3 
46 
I 
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1 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms (continued) 
3 Contaminated Combustible Solids: The 11 64-3 waste site contains no contaminated, combustible solids. contaminated, combustible solids would, 
4 in all likelihood, be limited to used PPE contained in drums. The amount of contamination present on used PPE is anticipated to be minimal. A high 
5 wind event could resuspend freshly deposited surface contamination, but the bulk of the waste will be protected from high winds by the waste drum. 
6 Section 5.2.4 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for this waste form is 4E-5/hr, or 3.2E-04 for an 8-hr duration. [Note: An 8-hr 
7 exposure is selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.J 
8 
9 Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Only loose contamination on the surfaces of noncombustible solids would be available for entrainment by 
10 high winds (Le., not combined with or embedded in the surface matrix). The majority of the surface contamination, on noncombustible solids, is 
11 expected to be in the form of a scale that is strongly affixed to the pipe or tank surfaces. The inventory in this form, potentially subjected to high wind 
12 entrainment, is anticipated to be minimal. Section 5.3.4 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for the entrainment of a sparse 
13 population of loose surface contamination from a noncombustible surface is 4E-5/hr, or 3.2E-04 for an 8-hr duration. [Note: An 8-hr exposure is 
14 selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.1 
16 Contaminated LisuidlSludQe: Liquid/sludge inadvertently released from the waste tanks may be entrained by wind during grouting activities. 
17 Liquidkludge or grouted material remaining in the tanks is protected from entrainment by wind. Section 3.2.4.5 of DOE (2000) indicates that the 
18 bounding R value for an outdoor pool at low windspeeds is 4E-7/hr, or 3.2E-06 for an 8-hr duration. [Note: An 8-hr exposure is selected consistent 
19 with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3.1 
20 
21 6.3 EXPLOSION (FLAMMABLE GASAIR MIXTURE DEFLAGRATION) 
22 Contaminated Solidified Matrix: The pressure rise generated by a flammable gaslair mixture deflagration during remediation activities could cause a 
23 resuspension of contaminated partially solidified or fragmented material from within the tank. However, large amounts of fuel (hundreds of pounds 
24 or more) are generally required for a flammable gaslair mixture to form an unconfined cloud within the fuel's flammable limits that then subsequently 
25 explodes. Such amounts of fuel will not be present during remediation activities. The tanks could potentially serve as a confining space for a 
26 flammable gadair mixture, but they are vented to atmosphere. If a deflagration were to occur within a tank, a small amount of contaminated partially 
27 solidified material could be resuspended. 
29 Section 4.3.2.2 of DOE (2000) states that pressure impulses generated by an explosive event that may entrain and hurl aggregate materials will not 
30 result in significant airborne releases unless aggregate materials are hurled at considerable velocities. It is estimated that the contaminated material 
31 that could be resuspended is negligible; therefore, contaminated solidified matrix materials are not considered further in this calculation. 
33 Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids expected to be present during remediation activities of the 116-C-3 tanks are 
34 limited to used PPE, which may be stored in drums near the waste site. Used PPE will have minimal contarnination and does not provide a rigid 
35 surface for pressurized gases to act upon. DOE (ZOOO), Section 5.2.2.3, states that the bounding R value for this scenario is 1E-03. 
37 Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Small amounts of contaminated noncombustible solids, such as piping, will be exposed during remediation 
38 activities. The majority of the surface contamination, on noncombustible solids, is expected to be in the form of a scale that is strongly affixed to the 
39 pipe or tank surfaces. Section 5.3.2.3 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for the release of pressurized gases over contaminated, 
40 noncombustible materials is 2E-03. 
41 
42 Contaminated LiQuid/SludQe: It is possible that a deflagration could occur within a tank during grouting activities. However, because the amount of 
43 flammable gases will be relatively small and the tanks are vented to atmosphere, the potential damage is anticipated to be low. It is believed that 
44 most of the partially grouted liquidlsludge or grouted material in the tanks would not be affected by a deflagration in the headspace. Section 
45 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for an overall vessel failure would be 4E-5. Given that the waste site consists of tanks 
46 that will be mostly underground throughout remediation activities, it is believed that this value is very conservative. 
2 
15 
28 
32 
36 
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I 6.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated Release Mechanisms (continued) 
2 
3 6.4 VEHICLUEXCAVATOR IMPACT 
4 
5 Contaminated SoillPulverized Grout: A vehicle or excavator impact to contaminated soil or the contaminated soil pulverized grout matrix 
6 could result in resuspension of the material. However, only a small fraction of the potentially contaminated volume could be affected. 
7 Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is not directly applicable to this scenario due to the physical differences between the experimental 
8 conditions (powder placed on a plywood sheet or in a quart can within a vented metal box) and the tank remediation activities but it does 
9 provide a reference point. The bounding R value in Section 4.4.3.3.2 of DOE (2000) is 2E-03. 
10 
I I Contaminated Combustible Solids: Contaminated combustible solids expected to be present during remediation activities of the 1 16-C-3 
12 tanks are limited to used PPE, which may be stored in drums near the waste site. Used PPE will have minimal contamination. 
13 Vehicle/equipment impact to packaged, contaminated PPE could result in a failure of the drum and suspension of surface contamination, 
14 Section 5.2.3.2 of DOE (2000), states that the bounding R value for this scenario is 1 E-04. 
16 Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: Contaminated noncombustible solids, such as piping, will be exposed during remediation activities. 
17 Contaminated particles adhering to the surface of the noncombustible solids would be subject to release by impact due to the resultant 
18 flexing of the solid, The majority of the surface contamination, on noncombustible solids, is expected to be in the form of a scale that 
19 strongly affixed to the pipe or tank surfaces and most of this will, in turn, be protected from impact by at least 2 feet of soil. Section 
20 5.3.3.2.2 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for impact to contaminated, noncombustible materials that do not brittle 
21 fracture is 2E-03. 
22 
23 Contaminated liquidlsludqe: It is possible that an impact to a tank could occur during grouting activities. However, because the bulk of 
24 the tanks will remain underground, any impact is expected to be limited to the top section of a tank. It is expected that most of the 
25 ungrouted liquid/sludge or grouted liquid/sludge in the tanks would not be affected by an impact. Section 3.2.2.3.2 of DOE (2000) 
26 indicates that the bounding R value for an overall vessel failure would be 4E-05. Given that overall vessel failure would probably not occur 
27 as a result of an impact, it is believed that this value is very conservative. 
29 6.5 FIRE 
31 Contaminated Soil or Grout Matrix: The area surrounding the 116-C-3 site consists of cobbles without significant amounts of vegetation. 
32 The contaminated soil or contaminated grout associated with the 116-C-3 remediation is noncombustible. Fire is judged to result in an 
33 insignificant release. 
34 
35 Contaminated Combustible Solids: Combustible solids expected to be present during remediation activities of the 116-C-3 tanks are 
36 limited to used PPE, which may be stored in drums near the waste site. PPE will have minimal amounts of contamination, Section 5.2.1.1 
37 of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R value for packaged, contaminated combustible materials that are heated/burned is 5E-04. 
38 This value was judged to be bounding for conditions under consideration (e.g., ignition of the soft waste from an external source such as a 
39 range fire or an internal source such as a vehicle fire). 
41 Contaminated Noncombustible Solids: A fire could eject some of the contamination from the metal tank or pipe surfaces due to flexing of 
42 the solid surface. Tanks, piping, structural components, concrete, underground transfer lines, etc. will be size reduced utilizing cutting 
43 torches, hydraulic shears, grinders, snippers, wire saws or by mechanical disassembly, as applicable. Section 5.3.1 of DOE (2000) 
44 indicates that the bounding R value for this event is 6E-05. It is expected that only a small fraction of the total inventory would be subject 
45 to release by this mechanism. 
15 
28 
30 
40 
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I 
I 6.5 Fire (Continued) 
2 
3 Contaminated LiauidWudae: A potential initiator of an onsite fire could be ignition of gasoline or diesel from the excavator. It is possible for the 
4 pipinghanks to be heated by a fire and, as a result, the unsolidified liquidsludge contents could also be heated. It is anticipated that the energy 
5 input from a worst-case fire would be insufficient to result in boiling of the liquids. Section 3.2.1 .I of DOE (2000) indicates that the bounding R 
6 value for heating of shallow pools of aqueous solutions is 3E-05, which is based on experiments involving ml volumes of solution in a shallow 
7 steel dish. While this is not directly applicable to the situation of heating 34,800 L (9,193 gallons) of liquidkludge, it does provide a reference 
8 point. The R value for heating of the liquidkludge would be expected to be significantly less than 3E-05. 
9 
i o  6.6 Summarv Of Release Values 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
zz Nearly all of the radiological inventory associated with the 1 16-C-3 chemical storage tanks is expected to be in the form of contaminated 
23 liquidsludge contained within the tanks solidified or unsolidified depending on the remediation stage. The inventory associated wilh the other 
24 two waste forms (combustible and noncombustible) is expected to be orders of magnitude less. Based on the bounding R value determined for 
2s each waste form and the potential radiological inventory associated with each form, it is believed that a bounding R value of 4E-5. as determined 
26 for liquidkludge, is a reasonably conservative value to apply to the entire inventory of the tanks for FHC purposes. It is recognized that some 
27 events, particularly those involving contaminated combustibles and contaminated noncombustibles, can produce higher values. Conversely, 
28 some events involving contaminated soil would produce smaller values. However, the higher release events would only affect a small fraction of 
29 the total inventory. 
Entrainment rates based on an 8 hr durdtm. See Section 6.2, Sheets 5-6. 
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Total 
Inventory 
Isotope Steel (Ci)* Soil (Ci)" Liquids (C$ Sludge (Ci)" (Ci) 
Am-241 -- -- -- 4.1E-01 4.1E-01 
C-14 2.4E-04 4.8E-04 7.1E-04 3.OE-04 1.7E-03 
CO-60 l.lE-04 2.2E-04 3.38-04 2.1E-02 2.2E-02 
% 
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(3-137 3.5E-01 7.1E-01 l.lEt-00 2.9E-01 2.4E+00 
Eu-152 -- -- -- 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 
Eu-154 -- -- -- 3.3E-03 3.3E-03 
H-3 6.7E-04 1.4E-03 2.OE-03 7.6E-05 4.1E-03 
1 8.0 Inventory of North and South Tanks 
13 
14 
I5  
16 
17 
Ni-63 -- -- 6.9E+00 6.9E+00 
Pu-239/240 -- -- -- 1.8E+OO 1 .8E+OO 
Pu-241b -- -- -- 1.8E+00 1.8E+00 
Pu-238 -- -- -- 8.6E-03 8.6E-03 
Sr-90 2.9E-02 5.9E-02 8.7E-02 7.6E+00 7.8E+00 
18 
19 
U-233/234 4.OE-05 8.1E-05 1.2E-04 4.5E-03 4.7E-03 
TJ-238 4.3E-05 S.SE-05 1.3E-04 4.6E-03 4.8E-03 
20 
21 
Y-90C 2.9E-02 5.9E-02 8.7E-02 I 7.6E+00 I 7.8E+00 
Total 4.1E-01 8.3B-01 1.2E+00 1 2.6E+01 1 2.9Et-01 
22 
23 'Inventory calculated in MAR calculation 0100C-CA-NOOI I, Rev. 0 (BHI 2005). 
24 Although not included in laboratory analyses, an inventory for Pu-241 have been included above 
25 for sludge. Assuming weapons-grade Pu and 45 year-old material, the inventory for Pu-241 has 
26 been estimated to be equal to that of Pu-239/240 (based on a Pu-241:Pu-239/240 ratio of 1 for the 
27 sludge material in the 116-C-3 tanks). Other isotopes (e.g., U-235) would also be expected; :: however, the inventory from such isotopes are considered negligible contributors to the sum-of-the 
3o ratios values. 
31 'Y-90 is assumed to be secular equilibrium with its parent Sr-90. Ba-137111 is also in secular 
32 equilibrium with its parent Cs-137 but since there is no EPA Release Values reported in EPA 
33 (1989) this radionuclide was not included in the FHC Calcs. 
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Originator: 
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CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTlTtES REVISED FOR APPROPRLATE RELEASE VALUES 
Food(Z) ~djusted'~'  Wnter~4) ~djusted"' 
Inhalation Direct(6) 
Exposure RV TQREVISED('I) 
(Ci> (Ci) 
RV 
(Ci) 
Element RE,,,(') RHA IngestionRV Ingestion Food RV Ingestion RV Rv 
(Ci) (Ci) (Ci) ((3 
1.3E+OI 
C-14 5.E-0 1 4.OE-05 1.5E+02 2.1E+01 3.E+05 3.OE+03 
C0-60'~) 1 .E-03 4.OE-05 6.OE+01 1.5E+03 v. Ig. 1.6E+02 4.E+03 1.5EX)i 2.8E+02 
CS-137 l.E-02 4.OE-05 3.OE+00 7.5E+02 v. Ig. 1 .OE+02 3.E+04 6.5E+01 I .3E+03 
Eu-152 l.E-02 4.OE-05 2.4E+01 6.OEM3 v. Ig. l.OE+Ol 3.E+03 3.5E+01 7.OE+02 
Eu-154 1 .E-02 4.OE-05 1.5E+01 3.8E+03 v. Ig. 1.OE+01 3.E+03 4.2E+01 8.4E+02 
H-3 5.E-01 4.OE-05 5.9E+03 8.3E+02 1 .E+07 1.2E+05 
Ni-63 1 .E-02 4.OE-05 2.7E+02 6.8E+04 v. Ig. 1.OE+03 3.E+05 1.4EM6 
PU-238 1 .E-03 4.OE-05 2.1E+00 5.3E+01 v. Ig. 3.1E-02 8.E-01 1.6E+01 
Pu-241 l.E-03 4.OE-05 9.OE+01 2.38+03 v. Ig. 1.6E+00 4.E+01 1.4E+08 8.OE+02 
Sr-90 1 .E-02 4.OE-05 8.2E-01 2.1E+02 v. Ig. 2.1Ei-00 5.E+02 4. I E+03 
Am-241 1 .E-03 4.OE-05 3.OE-01 7.5E+00 v. Ig. 2.68-02 7.E-01 
P~-239/240 1 .E-03 4.OE-05 1.8E+00 4.5E+01 v. Ig. 2.6E-02 7.E-01 1.7E+06 1.3E+01 
U-2331234 l.E-03 4.OE-05 3.OE+00 7.5EM1 v. Ig. 2.1 E-01 5.E+00 7.5EN5 1.1 E+02 
U-238 l.E-03 4.OE-05 3.OE+00 7.5E+Ol v. ig. 2.IE-01 5.E+00 1.1  E+02 
Y-90 l.E-02 4.OE-05 7.1EMI 1.8E+04 v. Ig. 3.1 E+02 8.E+04 3.6E+05 
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1 9  Notcs: 
20 v. Ig. lndicatcs that the sorption cocficicnt is grcatcr than zcro and the rclcasc valuc is much gcatcr than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
21 -- indicatcs that no gamma rays arc cmittcd or thc g a m  rays which arc cmittcd havc gamma ray cncrgics of less than 0.07 McV and arc strongly ancnuatcd in air. No rclcasc 
22 valuc for thc dircct cxposurc pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
2 3  
24 
2 5  ( I )  As rcportcd in Appendiv A of "Technical Background Documcnt to Support Final Rulcmaking Pursuant to Scction 102 of the Comprchcnsivc Environmcntal Rcsponsc, 
2 6  Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclidcs", EPA Contract 68-03-3452.0289 
27  (2) A rclcasc of RV to atmosphcre produccs a dosc of 0.5 rcm via the food ingestion pathway. Assumcs deposition on crops 30 mctcrs from thc point of rclcase. Dispersion bascd 
2 8  on cxtnpolation of ground lcvcl data for stability class D and 1 d s c c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m'/scc). 
29  (3) Food ingcstion.and inhalation RVs adjusted by multiplying cach original valuc by ratio of (&A / kbd. SCC notc 7 bclow. 
30 (4) A rclcasc of RV to groundwatcr produccs a dosc of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumcs a well 30 mctcrs from thc point of relcasc. Contact timc = 9 days. 
31 lndcpcndcnt of thc airbornc rclcase fraction. 
3 2  (5) A rclcasc of RV to atmosphcre produccs a dosc of 0.5 rcm via the inhalation pathway. Assumcs a rcccptor 30 meters from the point of relcasc. Dispersion bascd on 
33 extrapolation of ground lcvcl data for stability class D and 1 d s c c  windspeed (WQ = 0.072 m%cc) and avcragc breathing rate (2.754 m'iscc). 
3 4  
35 (6) A p i n t  sourcc of RV produccs a dosc of 0.5 rcm at 30 mctcrs in 24 hours. Indcpcndcnt of airbomc rclcasc fraction. 
3 6  (7) TQ = 20 x thc minimum valuc of ((Food RV x REPAR,<,& Water RV, (Inhalation RV x &PAIRHh), or Direct Dosc RV). The valuc "20" rcsults from the EPA RVs bcing bascd 
37 on ill1 cffcctivc dosc of0.5 rein and thc 1027 valucs bcing bascd on an cffcctivc dosc of I O  rem (is., [0.5 rcm x 20 = I O  rcm]). 
38 
3 9  (8) Thc most rcstrictivc valuc from EPA (1989) is direct cxposurc. 20 timcs this valuc is 300 Ci. The TQ listcd in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more rcstrictivc valuc of 280 Ci is 
40 uscd. 
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Sechtel Hanford, /nc= CALCULATION SHEET 
/ 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
T. M. BIakley&& Date: 7/25/2005 Calc. No.: 0100C-CA-N0012 Rev. No.: 0 
116-C-3 Remediation Job No.: 22192 Checked: M.F. Maxson9q$p Date: 7 / J 7 / 0 ~  
116-C-3 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (Revised TQs) Sheet No.: 12 of 12 
1 11.0 Sum of the Ratios 
L 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Inventory At 1 Risk TQORIGJNAL TQREV~SED 
21 
22 Calculations 
23 
24 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = MAW1027 CATEGORY 3 REVISED TQ (Ci) 
25 Notes. 
26 'Total radionuclide inventory from Shect IO. 
27 *Original TQ value is fmm DOE-STD-1027. 
28 'The revised TQ values are calculated on Sheet 1 I .  
29 
01 00C-CA-N0012~Rev~O~l16-C-3~FHC Revised TQ Values/Calc( 12) (Sum of Ratios) 
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